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Troubling Degrees of Authority:




"I feel as never before that this whole question of women's rights
turns on the pivot of the marriage relation, and, mark my word,
sooner or later it will be the topic for discussion." '
Marriage2 historically has functioned as a cornerstone of fam-
ily and society.3 In recognition of the importance of marriage, the
law has sought to promote marital unity.4 The traditional common
law conception of marital unity was that "man and wife are one -
but the man is the one."5 This view of the marital regime was pre-
mised on severely unequal marital roles. As "the one," the husband
exercised almost complete authority over his wife in the home and
had complete authority to speak for her outside the home.6 The
wife, as less than "the one," held very little authority in marriage or
* B.A., Rice University (1988); J.D., Emory University School of Law (1994).
My thanks go to Professor Deborah Young for her help and encouragement.
1. JOAN HOFF, LAw, GENDER, AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN
276 (1991) (quoting 1853 letter from Elizabeth Cady Stanton to Susan B. Anthony).
2. This article discusses marriage as a legal union between a woman and a
man. Same-sex marriage is not explored here. For a discussion of this issue, see
Adrienne K. Wilson, Note, Same-Sex Marriage: A Review, 17 WM. MrrnmmLL L. REv.
539 (1991).
3. See, e.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888). Marriage "is an institution,
in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the
foundation of the family and of society." Id. at 211. The Supreme Court has charac-
terized marriage as a fundamental right. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
4. See, e.g., DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, 250 P.2d 598 (1952). "The family is the basic
unit of our society, the center of the personal affections that ennoble and enrich
human life .... Since the family is the core of our society, the law seeks to foster and
preserve marriage." Id. at 601. States provide married couples with a number of
benefits, including parenting and custody rights, health care for spouse and depen-
dents, bereavement leave, tax benefits, inheritance and property rights, pensions,
and social security. Wilson, supra note 2, at 540.
5. Glanville L. Williams, The Legal Unity of Husband and Wife, 10 MOD. L.
Rxv. 16, 18 (1947).
6. "A man has just as good a right to his wife, as to the property acquired under
a marriage contract." Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 696
(1819) (Story, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). The authority of the husband in
early American law is described "as unquestioned as that of a military officer." ROB-
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society.7 As a result, common law tradition steadfastly held mar-
ried women in a private and subordinate position while granting
husbands the decision-making authority. By promoting these
traditional ideas of marital unity, the law bolstered and validated
this extreme power imbalance in marital roles.S
This article argues that courts and legislatures continue to
conceptualize and promote marital unity based on hierarchical
marital roles which grant husbands an extensive amount of author-
ity over their wives. Married women remain constrained by a legal
and legislative climate unsympathetic to their need for equality.
Part I presents an historical overview of marriage, focusing on the
ways in which the common law traditionally relegated wives to a
subordinate role, and explores some of the forces that eventually
prodded American courts and legislatures into allowing married
women more decision-making power. Parts II and III illustrate
that despite increasing equality in the status of married women,
common law views of unequal marital roles continue to shape judi-
cial decisions and legislative action.
Part 11 discusses the confidential communication privilege in
evidence law. The confidential communication privilege, which is
aimed at fostering marital unity, largely functions to prevent the
witness-wife9 from testifying against her defendant-husband,lo
thereby silencing the wife and maintaining her subordinate status.
ERT 0. BLOOD, JR. & DONALD M. WOLFE, HUSBANDS & WIvEs: THE DYNAMICS OF
MARRIED LIVING 3 (1960).
7. A wife's "great virtue was submissiveness and obedience to the will of her
spouse .... [N]o one wished to consider what [wives] might do on their own account
or for their own reasons." John Demos, The American Family in Past Time, in FAM-
ILY IN TRANSrrION 59, 68 (Arlene S. Skolnick & Jerome H. Skolnick eds., 2d ed. 1977).
8. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (Bradley, J.,
concurring).
[C]ivil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide dif-
ference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman ....
The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the di-
vine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domes-
tic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions
of womanhood .... The harmony... [of] the family institution is re-
pugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent
career from that of her husband.
Id. at 141.
For an example of the persistence of this judicial approval of law mandating
unequal marital roles, see Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), overruled by Payne v.
Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991). "Despite the enlightened emancipation of women
from the restrictions and protections of bygone years, and their entry into many
parts of community life formerly considered to be reserved to men, woman is still
regarded as the center of home and family life." Id. at 61-62.
9. For an explanation of why this article uses this gender-specific term, see in-
fra note 131.
10. See infra note 131.
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Part II concludes by proposing two modifications to this privilege to
ensure that it is no longer used to attain a type of marital unity
premised on depriving a married woman of decision-making
authority.
Part III discusses the husband notification requirement that
the Supreme Court invalidated in Planned Parenthood v. Casey"1
by a five to four vote. The aim of the requirement was to foster
marital unity by compelling married women seeking an abortion to
notify their husbands of their decision. The majority opinion illus-
trates the law's progress away from common law notions of marital
unity, which were premised on unequal marital roles, while the dis-
senting opinion shows how stubbornly some portions of the judici-
ary cling to these traditional roles.
The article concludes that the law's current attempts to pro-
mote marital unity are dangerous failures. Common law percep-
tions of a married woman's proper, subordinate role continue to
shape and mold the thinking of large segments of the courts and
legislatures. This thinking cannot be regarded as a safely senti-
mental attachment to history and tradition, but must be recognized
as a threat to a woman's full and equal status in marriage and in
society. Courts, legislatures and society at large must confront the
troubling history of unequal marital roles and refuse to tolerate the
continuance of these roles. The article ends by offering a number of
suggestions on how the legal community can change to grant wo-
men equal status in marriage.
I. Marital Authority in America
A Lost Streams: America's Inheritance From England
"[Wiedlock is a locking together. It is true that man and wife are one
person; but understand in what manner. When a small brooke or
little river incorporateth with . . . the Thames, the poor rivulet
looseth her name;... A woman, as soon as she is married, is called
covert; ... she hath lost her streame."'12
American marriage law developed from a patriarchal back-
ground.13 The United States' legal conception of marriage is
founded in English common law, which sprang from the feudal doc-
11. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
12. THE LAWES RESOLUTION OF WoMEm's RIGHTs (1632) reprinted in 1 WOMEN IN
AMEmcAN LAW 27 (Marlene Stein Wortman ed., 1985) (emphasis in original).
13. BLOOD & WOLFE, supra note 6, at 15; see also MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN
AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY u4 EARLY AMERICA 7 (1986) (noting that the Puritans
"created a social and legal system in America that personified [patriarchy]").
1993]
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trine of coverture.X4 In modem terms, coverture is defined rather
innocuously as the principle of marital unity.i5 William Black-
stone's Commentaries more dramatically describe coverture as it
existed in eighteenth century England: "[T]he husband and wife are
one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the
woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorpo-
rated and consolidated into that of the husband."' 6 This view of
marital unity placed husbands in a position of economic control
over their wives because the act of marriage deprived the women of
their legal personality. 17 Specifically, coverture meant that mar-
ried women forfeited control of their real property to their husbands
and relinquished all rights to chattels owned at the time of mar-
riage.' 8 Married women also lost the right to contract and to sue.19
Additionally, wives were absolved of certain crimes they committed
in the presence of their husbands, because the law presumed they
acted at their husbands' direction.20 Moreover, the marital prop-
14. LEO KANowrrz-, WOMEN AND THE LAW 35 (1969). The concept of male domi-
nance embedded in this doctrine has been traced to early biblical interpretation. Id.
at 35, 37; see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1 (1975). For an explanation that offers some economic reasons for this tradi-
tional male-female arrangement of power, see Judd Marmor, Changing Patterns of
Femininity, in FAMIY IN TaANSMON 210 (Arlene S. Skolnick & Jerome H. Skolnick
eds., 1971). "With the evolution of agriculture, and the gradual development of pri-
vate property, the transfer of property from father to son became a paramount socio-
economic factor, and families began to be organized along patrilineal lines ....
[Giradually woman began to occupy a more and more subordinate role as a sexual
chattel of man." Id.
15. 1 WOMEN IN AMERicAN LAW, supra note 12, at 14 ("Traditional images of
family and gender roles became embodied in 'coverture', the legal principle of mari-
tal unity. From this concept flow the particular rights, obligations, and legal disabil-
ities of a wife.").
16. 1 WILLIAM BLAcKSTONE, CoMMENTARmEs *430 (1765) (emphasis added). This
description concerns the legal conception of marriage. The common law pictured an
"ideal" marriage between affluent parties. SALMON, supra note 13, at 14. The reality
for the majority of married couples differed greatly. However, the common law's
ideal of marital unity is explored in this article because the law pursued the ideal for
generations. Over this period of time, and continuing into the present, the law has
attempted to impose these "ideal" marital roles on marriages.
17. Marriage at this time was generally a permanent commitment. Aside from
extremely rare private divorce bills issued by Parliament, divorce was not allowed in
England until 1857. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HIsTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 181
(1973).
18. KANOwrrz, supra note 14, at 36.
19. 1 BLAcKsTONE, supra note 16, at *432; see infra notes 24-25 and accompany-
ing text.
20. Id. The grant to women of immunity from criminal prosecution in certain
instances "depend[ed] upon a sex-based discriminatory practice." KANowITz, supra
note 14, at 89. This immunity was based on the doctrine of presumed coercion. Id.
at 88. The doctrine was premised on the notion that "where a crime... was commit-
ted by a married woman conjointly with or in the presence of her husband, prima
facie she was not liable, as it was presumed that she acted in obedience to his com-
mands and under his coercion." O'Donnell v. State 117 P.2d. 139, 141 (1941). This
[Vol. 12:225228
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erty laws enforced the authority of the husband over the family.21
Lastly, the common law expressly held that married women were
inferior to their husbands, and considered married women incapa-
ble of independent thought or action. 22
Marriage also imposed duties upon husbands. Husbands were
obliged to support their wives, although this obligation did not ex-
tend beyond providing wives with necessities.2 3 Placing the duty
on husbands to support their wives relieved the state of its burden
of supporting women who, faced with the economic and social con-
straints of the time, would have been rendered destitute.24 Hus-
bands also were held responsible for their wives' premarital debts,
as well as all debts that occurred during the marriage.2 5
Two additional aspects of the common law on marriage are
helpful in establishing the eighteenth century legal view of married
women. First, the common law permitted a husband to physically
discipline his wife.26 The English common law's grant of physical
absolution, however, did not extend to treason or murder. 1 BLAcKSTON , supra note
16, at *432. The Supreme Court repudiated the blanket presumption of coercion in
U.S. v. Dege, 364 U.S. 51 (1960). However, a modified version of the presumption
still exists in some jurisdictions and is still an issue in criminal proceedings. See,
e.g., State of Missouri v. Isa, 850 S.W.2d 876 (1993) (rejecting a modified claim for
the coerced presumption by appellant-wife. Mrs. Isa was appealing a conviction of
first degree murder of her daughter committed in the presence of the appellant's
husband.).
21. 1 WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAw, supra note 12, at 13. The common law marital
property regime endowed the husband with control over the real property, including
property brought into the marriage by the wife. Id. at 14. Upon the death of her
husband, the wife received a dower right which allowed her a life interest in up to
50% of her husband's real property. Id. at 17. This dower right did not permit the
wife to sell or give away the property. Id. at 18. "A wife, in practice, was a tenant."
Id.
22. "But, though our law in general considers man and wife as one person, yet
there are some instances in which she is separately considered; as inferior to him,
and acting by his compulsion." 1 BLAcKSTONE, supra note 16, at *432. Thus, the
wife was held to be under the wing, protection and cover of her husband, for whom
she was to perform everything. Id. at *430.
23. Id. at *430.
24. While single women could not vote or serve on juries, they could contract and
own property. KANowrrz, supra note 14, at 35.
25. The wife's debts were shifted to her husband because through the act of mar-
riage he had "adopted her and her circumstances together." 1 BLAcKSTONE, supra
note 16, at *430-31. Additionally, a wife could not sue without her husband's "con-
currence" nor could she be sued without the husband being made a defendant. Id. at
*431.
26. A husband legally was allowed to "give his wife moderate correction." 1
BLAcKsToNE, supra note 16 at *432. Blackstone also observed that "this power of
correction was confined within reasonable bounds." Id. Reasonable correction
meant that a husband could use a switch to "chastise" his wife if the "switch were no
bigger than his thumb." Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections
on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 175, 177 (1982) [herein-
after The Equality Crisis].
1993]
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power to the husband was supported by a seemingly evenhanded
and dispassionate rationale. Blackstone noted that "[flor, as [a hus-
band] is to answer for [a wife's] misbehavior, the law thought it rea-
sonable to intrust him with this power of restraining her, by
domestic chastisement, in the same moderation that a man is al-
lowed to correct his servants or children."27 Common law thus
pointedly grouped married women with populations perceived as
less capable and untrustworthy. 28 These populations, like married
women, were accorded low social status and were legally deprived
of a large measure of their autonomy.
Second, neither husband nor wife was allowed to testify
against the other because this would entail the anomaly of one legal
personality effectively testifying against himself.29 This English
common law mandate was divided into two separate prohibitions:
the adverse testimony privilege and the spousal disqualification
doctrine.30 The adverse testimony privilege applied in civil and
criminal cases.3 1 Early English common law granted the husband
the power to hold the privilege, meaning that he decided whether to
allow his wife to testify against him.3 2 The spousal disqualification
doctrine, which can be seen as the flip side of the adverse testimony
privilege, automatically deemed a wife incompetent to testify for
her husband because courts reasoned that the husband's and wife's
27. 1 BLAcKsTOINE, supra note 16, at *432 (emphasis added). Blackstone used
much the same language in explaining that a teacher's authority permitted the
teacher to physically discipline students. Id. at *134. The teacher-student relation-
ship, like the common law master-servant, parent-child, and husband-wife relation-
ships, was premised on the notion that the wiser party justifiably held power over
the less rational and less capable party.
28. Another example showing that the common law equated married women
with these populations is that the law absolved servants of many crimes. Id. at
*417. As with married women, the law assumed the servant acted at the master's
(husband's) express or implied command. Id.
29. Id. at *431. See also 8 J. WiGMORE, EvmNcE § 2227 (McNaughton rev.
1961).
30. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 29, at § 2227. The spousal disqualification doctrine
and the adverse testimony privilege both served to silence spousal testimony "re-
gardless of the actual testimony to be elicited." JoHN W. STRONG, 1 MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE §§ 78, 79 (4th ed., 1992) [hereinafter McCoRMicK]. In 1853, a third privi-
lege was statutorily enacted in England. Id. The privilege, which survives in
America, is called the "confidential communication privilege." Id. This additional
privilege is examined infra Part II.
31. Richard 0. Lempert, A Right to Every Woman's Evidence, 66 IowA L. REv.
725, 726 (1981). The first known reference to the privilege is in a 1580 English case.
8 WioMoRE, supra note 29, § 2227. The privilege appears in statutory law in the
second half of the nineteenth century. Joseph A. Fawal, Note, Questioning the Mari-
tal Privilege, 7 CUMB. L. REV. 307, 310 n.25 (1976).
32. Fairly early on in the development of the privilege, courts allowed an excep-
tion if the wife had been seriously injured by the husband and her testimony was the
only means of convicting the husband. McCoRMiciC, supra note 30, § 66.
[Vol. 12:225
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interests inevitably were identical.33 Courts found that because the
husband was unable to testify on his own behalf due to his self-
interest,3 4 the wife similarly was disabled since her interests auto-
matically mirrored her husband's.35 Both the privilege and the in-
competency doctrine were intended to promote marital unity 3 6 and
both historically silenced the wife rather than the husband.37
As described by Blackstone and others, the common law
plainly regarded the husband as the responsible party in the mar-
riage.38 The husband resided at the summit of the hierarchy over
wife and family.39 A husband's financial obligations were great,
but so were his authority and status in the public world and in the
private home.
Wives, meanwhile, existed at a subordinate and silent position
in both the public and private realms.40 The benefits they received
from marriage were premised on their civil death and rebirth as
33. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 29, § 2228. Identical interests meant that the hus-
band's interests were considered the interests of the marriage. See Fawal, supra
note 31, at 308 ("[T]his rule of exclusion was originally based upon the metaphysical
premise of Lord Coke that husband and wife were one .... [Tihe wife was assimi-
lated with the husband and shared his disqualification as an interested party.").
34. The "then current judicial belief [wals that interested parties were not credi-
ble witness in their own causes.' Note, The Husband-Wife Privileges of Testimonial
Non-Disclosure, 56 Nw. U.L. R.v. 208 (1961) [hereinafter Husband-Wife Privileges].
35. By assuming that the wife's interests were inevitably identical with her hus-
band's, the law again indicated its conception of married women as less than in-
dependent, less than capable, and literally "incompetent."
36. Blackstone expressly linked the privilege and the doctrine, stating that "in
trials of any sort, [husband and wife] are not allowed to be evidence for, or against,
each other: partly because it is impossible their testimony should be indifferent; but
principally because of the union of person." 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *431
(emphasis added); see also JERsMY BENTHAM, 5 RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE
344 (1827). "The reason [behind both the adverse testimony privilege and the dis-
qualification doctrine] that presents itself as... likely to have been the original one,
is the gringribber, nonsensical reason, . . . Baron and Feme are one person in
law.... This quibble is the fountain of all reasoning." Id.
37. "[Tlhe early cases all deal with the privilege for a wife's testimony against
her husband (not the husband against the wife)." 8 WIGMORE, supra note 29, § 2227;
see also Lempert, supra note 31, at 727 (noting that "from the mid-seventeenth cen-
tury on, only a handful [of cases] involve men in a position to incriminate their
wives"). This has been attributed to the historically greater number of male defend-
ants than female defendants. Id. As to the incompetency doctrine, see Note, Devel-
opments in the Law - Privileged Communications, 98 HIARv. L. Rnv. 1450, 1564
(1985).
The confidential communication privilege, referred to supra note 30, also is in-
tended to promote marital unity and often its effect is to silence the wife rather than
the husband. See infra discussion Part II.
38. See supra notes 16-25 and accompanying text.
39. Husbands held legal authority over their children until the children attained
the age of twenty-one. 1 BLAcKroNE, supra note 16, at *441. Wives possessed no
legal authority over their children. Id.
40. One modern commentator has noted that at least the "wife was not reduced
to the position of, say, a dog." Williams, supra note 5, at 18.
19931 231
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economic and legal responsibilities for husbands to bear. As legal
nonentities, married women's independent economic potential was
severely limited, which required that they remain under the protec-
tion and authority of their husbands. 4X The legal disabilities placed
on married women, such as the inability to contract or to own prop-
erty, generally rendered them incapable of resolving their debts in-
dependently. The law's forgiveness of married women for their
debts and crimes was motivated by the belief that married women
were incapable of bearing responsibility for their actions.42 The ad-
verse testimony privilege and the incompetency doctrine also com-
municated this belief.43
Blackstone failed to acknowledge that the legal impediments
imposed on married women partly provoked married women's help-
lessness. Rather, Blackstone presented the common law not as a
culprit, but as an ally to married women.44 Equity jurisprudence
began to address the handicaps that the common law "protections"
imposed on married women. 45 The equity courts diminished some
of the financial disadvantages women encountered in marriage by
employing trusts, which allowed married women to hold real or per-
41. Professor Glendon notes that marital property law traditionally has repre-
sented an ideological statement about marriage and marital roles. Mary Ann Glen-
don, Matrimonial Property: A Comparative Study of Law and Social Change, 49 TuL.
L. REv. 21, 23 (1974). The fact that married women were denied control of their
property indicates that the law pictured a married woman's proper role as one de-
void of authority and under the control of their husband. Id.; see also John D. John-
ston, Jr., Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition, the Law School
Curriculum, and Developments Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1033, 1043
(1972) (arguing that studying the common law system in conjunction with property
law reveals assumptions about marital roles).
42. Remnants of this forgiveness persist in the current American criminal justice
system. See HILARY ALLEN, JUSTICE UNBALANCED: GENDER, PSYCHIATRY AND JUDI-
ciAL DECISIONS 10 (1987) (commenting on the criminal justice system's continued
reluctance to criminalize women or to subject them to the most severe penalties).
43. One commentator noted that the privilege should be abolished because it
"secures, to every man, one safe and unquestionable and ever ready accomplice for
every imaginable crime." 5 BENrTHAm, supra note 36, at 338. This statement as-
sumed that married women were too weak-minded and weak-willed to ever resist
their husbands' commands.
44. The disabilities a married woman faced at common law "are for the most part
intended for her protection and benefit." 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at *433.
Blackstone closed his discourse on the law between husbands and wives with the
solemn editorial comment that these disabilities evidence how "great a favourite is
the female sex of the laws of England." Id. Almost two hundred years later, the
Supreme Court characterized this comment as "self-deluding romanticism." United
States v. Dege, 364 U.S. 51, 54 (1960).
45. See, e.g., 1 WOMEN IN AMERiCAN LAw, supra note 12, at 15. As to the severity
of English marriage law, one commentator has noted that "the English system was
tolerable ... only for upper-class landowners, and even then only because of the
institutions mitigating its impact." FRIED-, supra note 17, at 185. For a good
summary of the impact of common law marital rules and equity in eighteenth cen-
tury England, see Johnston, supra note 41, at 1044-57.
[Vol. 12:225
1993] UNEQUAL MARITAL ROLES 233
sonal property as single women, free from their husband's control. 46
In contrast to married women's disabilities in the courts of law, the
courts of equity permitted a rudimentary capacity to contract.47
This anomaly between married women's legal death in the common
law courts and their apparent resurrection in equity courts indi-
cates that even Blackstone's era began to recognize that the notion
of marital unity premised on the complete legal disappearance of
wives was, if not unjust, at least severely impractical.
The equity courts presented only limited avenues for avoiding
the common law marital hierarchies. 48 Even the allowances made
by equity courts on behalf of married women reinforced existing so-
cietal attitudes regarding the incompetency of married women. For
example, before it was applied to married women, the equitable
trust had been used only to protect minors and persons of dimin-
ished mental capacity.49 As with Blackstone's description of hus-
bands' power of domestic chastisement, equity expressly linked
married women with populations inherently less capable and com-
petent, and who therefore required protection.5O
For all its tempering effects, then, the use of equity5 ' resem-
bled the common law system in two key respects. First, the benefits
46. KANowiTz, supra note 14, at 38. An equitable estate could be created either
by pre or post-nuptial agreement or upon the husband's "invoking the assistance of a
court of equity to reduce the wife's choses in action to possession." Id. A married
woman could dispose of her equitable estate by will, gift, or conveyance unless the
instrument creating the estate prevented her from doing so. Id.
47. Id. at 39.
48. Equitable trusts were designed and served only to assist the rich and there-
fore aided a relatively small population. FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at 185. In addi-
tion, equity addressed only property and contract rights and failed to "reflect any
fundamental social change in attitudes toward women." KANowrrz, supra note 14,
at 39. The fictional unity of the husband and wife persisted to form the basis of
criminal, tort, evidence, and family laws that discriminated against married women.
Id.
49. KANowrz, supra note 14 at 39-40. In the language of the times, equity tradi-
tionally was used on behalf of 'infants and idiots." Id.
50. See, e.g., HOFF, supra note 1, at 123 (explaining that equity jurisprudence
was based on the traditional notion that women needed to be protected through spe-
cial treatment).
51. In addition to equity, one other mitigating effect on the otherwise harsh law
of marriage should be noted. Courts of law allowed women to make antenuptial con-
tracts in order to ensure that their families retained control over the property that
the women brought into marriages. As with equity, several factors indicate that
such contracts had only a limited impact on the status of married women. First, the
courts' willingness to recognize such contracts stemmed from the English aristoc-
racy's concerns over property rights rather than a desire to provide legal impetus for
a more balanced husband-wife relationship. 1 WOMEN IN AMEmCAN LAw, supra note
12, at 19; see also M.ARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAw 88
(1989) [hereinafter TRANSFORMATION]. Additionally, while these antenuptial con-
tracts ostensibly granted women more authority and control in the marriage, courts
did so to quiet the fears of the woman's family. 1 WOMEN IN AMERiCAN LAw, supra
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of equity aided married women in some concrete ways (e.g., al-
lowing them to own property), while at the same time equity rein-
forced stereotypical images of women's helplessness, or worse, their
incompetence. Second, neither system allowed married women to
decide the degree of authority they should hold in marriage. In eq-
uity courts, the chancellor decided this issue; in common law courts,
the judge guarded the common law tradition which granted hus-
bands the power of decision. The views of married women were si-
lenced by both systems.5 2
The common law's image of marital unity along with the tem-
pering influence of equity combined to create a guardian/ward rela-
tionship between husbands and wives.5 3  A guardian/ward
relationship, by definition, establishes unequal roles because the
concept of guardianship stems from the assumption that the guard-
ian is more capable of speaking for the ward than the ward.5 4 By
tacitly appointing husbands as guardians, the English common law
gave husbands the voice and authority within marriage, and at the
same time "protected" helpless married women from themselves,
and shielded society from untrustworthy and irrational married
women. English common law deemed this unequal arrangement of
marital power as reasonable and just for all parties concerned.5 5
This marital regime, in which power was aligned along gender
lines, served as the model for marriage in America.
B. The Right to Direct - Marital Authority in America
"Americans [niever supposed that democratic principles should un-
dermine the husband's authority and make it doubtful who is in
note 12, at 19. What seems likely, then, is that the acceptance of antenuptial con-
tracts served, at least initially, to protect and foster the interests, not of the woman
but of her blood relatives. TRANSFORMATION, supra, at 88. Lastly, the tempering
legal influence of the courts of law, like equity, was limited to wealthy families and
thus failed to balance power distributions in the vast majority of marriages. Id.
52. Women's silence in the face of society and the law has been noted by a
number of writers. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MAcKiNNON, Francis Biddle's Sister: Por-
nography, Civil Rights, and Speech, in Fzzu, sms UNMODIFIED 163 (1987). For a
commentary on women's silence, see Hor, supra note 1, at 19, 35. The confidential
communication privilege in evidence law continues to silence married women. See
discussion infra part II.
53. Williams, supra note 5, at 18; see generally, HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE: LAw
OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 2.1 (2d ed., student edition, 1988)
(supplying a useful history of the legal relationship created by marriage).
54. A guardian is "[a] person lawfully invested with the power, and charged with
the duty, of taking care of the person... who, for defect of age, understanding, or
self-control, is considered incapable .... BLAcies LAW DIaTONARY 706 (6th ed.
1990).
55. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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charge of the family .... They therefore never deny him the right to
direct his spouse. 56
Marriage in early America was in many respects an economic
matter57 premised on the same sort of unequal marital roles as in
England.5 8 This similarity is not surprising because all the
states5 9 adopted Blackstone's version of the common law on mar-
riage.6 0 As in England, husbands were required to support their
wives 6 ' and wives were required to obey their husbands.6 2 The ex-
tensive authority of the husband was generally taken for granted.63
Courts routinely denied wives their ownership, contractual, profes-
sional and civil rights, reasoning that married women lacked legal
56. ALXs DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 324 (George Lawrence
trans., 2d ed. 1990).
57. Daughters passed from the economic control of their parents to the control of
their husbands. HOFF, supra note 1, at 282.
58. "To become a husband or a wife was to inhabit a legal role, a legal personal-
ity, that carried with it strong and stringent public expectations as to conduct and
responsibility. That legal person, that collection of legal rights and duties - the hus-
band, the wife - existed regardless of an individual's relative discontent with the
identity." Hendrik Hartog, Marital Exits and Marital Expectations in Nineteenth
Century America, 80 GEO. L.J. 95, 97 (1991).
59. "The State ... has absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the
marriage relation between its own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which
it may be dissolved." Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1878). Because mar-
riage was deemed a state responsibility, reform of the marital regime has proceeded
on a piecemeal basis, state by state. See HOFF, supra note 1, at 280 (explaining
conjugal relationships as regulated by state law, with the federal government or the
Supreme Court intervening only when "the states appear to be infringing upon the
private rights of individuals").
60. 1 WOMEN iN AMEaicAN LAw, supra note 12, at 14. Blackstone's works pro-
vided "a primary reference on women's position through most of the nineteenth cen-
tury" in America. Id. at 15; see also HOFF, supra note 1, at 88-89 (noting that
Blackstone's Commentaries were used to train attorneys and as a guide in codifying
American law).
Some differences did exist between marriage in England and marriage in early
America. For example, common law marriages were recognized in early America,
perhaps due to a scarcity of clergy able to perform the wedding ceremony and a dis-
persed population. FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at 180. Divorce also seems to have
been slightly easier to obtain in early America than in England. Id. at 181.
Although, even in early America, the availability of divorce varied by regional area.
Id.
61. The common law, as adopted by early America, imposed on husbands the
obligation to support their wives. KANowrrz, supra note 14, at 70. However, "[tihe
precise nature of the husband's legal duty to support his wife is . . . rarely ever
articulated while the marriage is in progress." Id. Some courts defined the hus-
band's support obligations extremely narrowly. See, e.g., McGuire v. McGuire, 59
N.W.2d 336 (1953) (finding that although the husband refused to purchase clothes
for his wife over a period of years and also refused to install indoor plumbing, the
husband nonetheless adequately supported his wife).
62. Demos, supra note 7, at 63 (explaining a woman's position within marriage
as "distinctly subordinate").
63. "[Tlhe husband's economic and social roles almost automatically gave him
pre-eminence." BLOOD & WoLFE, supra note 6, at 29 (emphasis added).
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personalities separate from their husbands.64 Also, America
adopted6 5 from England the adverse testimony privilege66 as well
as the spousal incompetency doctrine. 67 The American courts thus
implicitly accepted that married women should not be given the
power to testify against their husbands and the notion that wives'
interests inevitably mirrored their husbands' interests.
Given the widespread belief that married women were less ca-
pable than their husbands, the legal handicaps placed on married
women generally were accepted and endorsed by society.68 Legal
opinions have objectified married women to the extent that they are
defined as a property interest upon which husbands have a right of
64. HOFF, supra note 1, at 22. Interestingly, as in England, single women in
America held more rights than their married counterparts and were allowed to con-
tract and to sue and be sued. 1 WOMEN IN AMmucA LAw, supra note 12, at 89.
Perhaps one reason single women were permitted these rights was simply because
the vast majority of women were married. Michael Grossberg, Guarding the Altar,
in LAw, SocimrY AND DomEsTc RELATIONS 198 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1987) (almost
ninety percent of men and women were married); see also Mmn ABRAMOVrrz, REGU-
LATING TE LivEs OF WOMEN 53 (1988) (in some English dialects in early America,
the word "wife" was synonymous with the word "woman."). "(Clolonial laws en-
couraged white women and men to marry...." Id. at 55. Allowing limited rights to
a small population of unmarried women may not have been perceived as any great
threat or concession to the then existing marital regime. This dichotomy between a
married woman's rights and a single woman's rights continues today. See infra
parts II and III.A.
65. "Prior to the enactment of legislation governing the applicability of common
law privileges in federal proceedings, United States federal courts assumed that all
such privileges applied and, in the absence of legislation, could be modified as the
courts saw fit." Amy G. Bermingham, Note, Partners in Crime: The Joint Partici-
pants Exception to the Privilege Against Adverse Spousal Testimony, 53 FoRDHAM L.
REv. 1019, 1023 (1985) (citing Wolfe v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934)).
66. Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. 209 (1839), was the earliest Supreme Court case to
recognize the privilege. 'Public policy and established principles forbid [the wife's
voluntary or compelled testimony]. This rule is founded upon the dearest and sound-
est principles of our nature." Id. at 223.
As construed by courts in this country, the privilege commenced upon marriage
and terminated when the marriage ended. McCoRmIc, supra note 30, § 66. Excep-
tions were allowed in criminal prosecutions against the husband for bodily injury to
his wife. Id. These exceptions were expanded to include cases of bigamy, adultery,
rape, crimes against the child of either spouse, and support proceedings. Id. at n.11.
There is some authority to suggest that the early privilege expressly prevented wives
from testifying against their husbands and only later became a gender-neutral pro-
hibition. See People v. Hamacher, 438 N.W.2d 43, 55 (Mich. 1989) (Boyle, J.,
dissenting).
67. In Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189 (1920), the Court found the
disqualification doctrine to be so well established that it "hardly requir[ed] mention."
Id. at 195.
68. The Old Testament's patriarchal model, economics, and the law contributed
to this conception. AsRAMovrrz, supra note 64, at 54. There were also unspoken but
unmistakably real feelings of suspicion and fear toward women generally. Demos,
supra note 7, at 63.
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control. 69 Societal norms have supported the image of wives as con-
trolled pieces of property. Simultaneously, the public approval of
such legal decisions indicates that the law shaped and validated un-
equal marital roles. 70
American equity courts helped alleviate some of the harshest
restrictions which the courts of law imposed on married women. 71
As in England, these equitable means of counteracting the severity
of the common law were limited.72 Moreover, by grouping women
with less capable, less rational, and less trustworthy populations
and emphasizing their perceived weakness,73 the law of equity also
69. See, e.g., Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 518, 696-7
(1819) (Story, J., concurring).
A man has just as good a right to his wife, as to the property acquired
under a marriage contract. He has a legal right to her society and her
fortune; and to devest [sic] such right without his default, and against
his will, would be as flagrant a violation of the principles of justice, as
the confiscation of his own estate.
Id. (emphasis in original).
70. "[W]hatever is authoritatively said creates reality." MAcKINNON, supra note
52, at 220 (emphasis in original); see also HOFF, supra note 1, at 105. "Dartmouth
College is ... important as a general reflection of how entrenched the social con-
struction of married women according to Blackstonian views on their common-law
disabilities was within the top echelon of the judicial system....' Id.
71. Equity, through antenuptial agreements and bequests, made it possible for
wives to control the use and "disposition of the property [they] brought into marriage
or acquired during marriage." 1 WOMEN IN AmERicAN LAW supra note 12, at 20.
Although equity permitted married women the ability to control such property, in
reality women were far more concerned with the right to bequeath their property to
persons of their choosing. Id. Inheritance served as an important method of ob-
taining capital in early America, and the power to bequeath was a key determinant
to the next generation's status. Id. Therefore, "the ability to choose a beneficiary...
[was] central to the issue of power and status." Id. This increased control and inde-
pendence was perceived as troublesome because it changed the otherwise inviolate
structure of authority within marriage and was therefore thought to undermine
unity. Id.
72. Several factors limited the mitigating impact of equity. First, in theory as
well as in practice, the laws governing the marriage regime expressed the values of
elites. See TRANSFORMATION, supra note 51, at 88 (commenting on the ignored needs
of the middle and lower classes during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centu-
ries). Second, married women and their families who resorted to courts of equity
were hampered by the limited number of these courts. FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at
185. Third, in early America, married women tended not to take advantage of equity
and legal developments that allowed them more control over their property.
SALMON, supra note 13, at 13. These women often feared the autonomy that was
becoming available. Id. Even with equitable practices, most married women in 1800
still were legally incapable of being parties to litigation or of owning property in
their own names. HOFF, supra note 1, at 89.
73. As Justice Story noted:
[In] the exercise of jurisdiction by Courts of Equity in regard to married
women, for their protection, support and relief .... as well as in...
regard to infants and lunatics, we cannot fail to observe the parental
solicitude, with which Courts of Equity administer to the wants, and
guard the interests, and succor the weakness of those who are left with-
out any other protectors....
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confirmed the perception that married women were ill equipped to
cope with any amount of authority beyond the minimal power that
marriage accorded them.7 4
The Married Women's Property Acts (the Acts) of the mid-
nineteenth century improved their legal position. These Acts al-
lowed married women to sue and be sued without joining their hus-
bands, to contract, to oversee the property they brought into the
marriage, and to work without their husbands' permission as well
as retain their earnings from this employment.75 Passage of the
Acts was prompted by economic concerns, in particular, the morass
of common law rules impeding the speed and efficiency of the land
market.76 A related economic reason for passage of the Acts is that
husbands were given such an extensive degree of control over their
wives, any default or misstep by husbands, such as desertion or im-
provident investment, rendered their wives and children economi-
cally helpless. The state was then forced to assume responsibility.
Married women's situation thus improved, not because of a general
desire to grant them a more equal role in marriage and in society,77
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN ENG-
LAND AND AMERICA 2:654-55 (Boston, Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1839) (em-
phasis added).
74. This pervasive sense that women were intrinsically less capable than men
had "hardened into a nearly unshakable ideology by the Civil War." Michael S.
Hindus & Lynne E. Withey, The Law of Husband and Wife in Nineteenth-Century
America: Changing Views of Divorce, in 2 WOMEN AND THE LAw: A SOCIAL HisTOR-
CAL PERSPECTIVE 133, 134 (Kelly Weisberg ed., 1982).
75. KANOwITz, supra note 14, at 40. Mississippi, in 1839, was the first state to
enact such an act. FRmEDMAN, supra note 17, at 185. By 1850, seventeen states had
similar laws. Id. at 186. England did not give married women control over their
earnings until 1870. Glendon, supra note 41, at 31.
Provisions of the Married Women's Property Acts differed greatly from state to
state. 1 WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAw, supra note 12, at 118. Some judges limited the
ameliorative impact of these laws. KANOwrrz, supra note 14, at 40. Nonetheless,
these acts have been termed a "andora's box" because they represented the first
signs of legal improvement for married women. 1 WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAW, supra
note 12, at 120. For a brief summary of these acts, see Johnston, supra note 41, at
1057-70. For a thorough discussion of American women's property rights in general,
see SALMON, supra note 13.
76. FRIEDMAN, supra note 17, at 186; see also, 1 WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAw, supra
note 12, at 16. "For the market system to work effectively.., creditors and purchas-
ers needed procedures for conveying land and securing full title that were simpler
than the common-law legal forms." Id.
77. In accepting the validity of the Married Women's Property Acts, the Supreme
Court adopted a somewhat resigned tone: "[tihe statutes have not deprived the hus-
band of the services of the wife in the household, in the care of the family, or in and
about his business, yet they have bestowed on her, independent of him, her earnings
on her own account, and given her authority to acquire them." Texas & Pac. Ry. v.
Humble, 181 U.S. 57, 63 (1901). "To a certain limited extent, as, for example, in
fixing the domicil, and in being responsible under ordinary circumstances for its or-
derly management, the husband is still the head of the family. But in some particu-
lars a married woman is now independent of her husband's control." Id. at 65.
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but instead because of state financial concerns. Common law disa-
bilities which did not overtly harm economic matters remained
intact.78
Despite the Married Women's Property Acts' removal of the
worst civil disabilities placed on married women, women continued
to occupy a lower rung in the marital hierarchy.79 Married women
now were recognized legally in some aspects, but were still situated
in a private and subordinate sphere.SO Wives' authority extended
over the home and children.81 Husbands, however, had the final
say concerning family life.s 2
The tradition of noninterference, even after passage of the
Married Women's Property Acts, meant that the courts would not
intervene in the home unless divorce, separation, or abandonment
occurred.83 Noninterference helped to cement the husband's au-
thority by allowing him to exercise extensive economic and social
78. For example, married women still did not have the right to keep their name
upon marriage, and they were legally obligated to live wherever their husbands
chose to establish domicile. KANowrrz, supra note 14, at 41-52. Married women also
remained subject to their husbands' physical coercion, were required to provide do-
mestic services, and to obey their husbands. JuDrm A. BAER, 2 WOMEN IN AMERICAN
LAw: THE STRuG.LE TowARD EQUALITY FROM THE NEw DEAL To THE PRusEr 123
(1991).
79. The Equality Crisis, supra note 26, at 177. Blackstone's theory of marital
unity was "replaced by a theory that recognized women's legal personhood but which
assigned her a place before the law different and distinct from that of her husband."
Id. Under this new theory, of separate spheres, "the husband was the couple's repre-
sentative in the public world and its breadwinner; the wife was the center of the
private world of the family." Id. (citing NANCY Corr, THE BoNDs OF WOMANHOOD, at
197-200 (1977)). Although the separate spheres theory advanced the position of
married women, it also "preserved and promoted the dominance of male over fe-
male." Id.
80. See, e.g., On Women's Sphere, 1 WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAw, supra note 12, at
154. Mrs. A.J. Graves wrote in 1841 "[tlhat [a] woman should regard home as her
appropriate domain is not only the dictate of religion, but of enlightened human rea-
son." Id. Even in the nineteenth century, divorce was difficult to obtain. Hartog,
supra note 58, at 105. Insisting on an illusion of marital unity, courts declined to
grant divorces even for marriages that were obviously over. Id. Wives continued to
be viewed as dependent beings, expected to submit to the superior will of their hus-
bands. Demos, supra note 7, at 68. See generally NANCY F. Corr, THE BONDS OF
WOMANHOOD (1977) (explaining in depth the separate spheres theory).
81. TRANSFORMATION, supra note 51, at 88.
82. Id. Americans believed "that nature... clearly intended to give [husbands'
and wives'] diverse faculties a diverse employment." TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 56, at
324. The "family home was... a man's castle but a woman's place." ANITA L. ALLEN,
UNEASY AccEss: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY 63 (1988) [hereinafter UN-
EASY AccEss].
83. See, e.g., TRANSFORMArION, supra note 51, at 86 (noting that the long-stand-
ing practice of noninterference in private life came in time to be regarded as princi-
ple"). In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court stated that the
marital relationship was protected by "a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights...." Id. at 486.
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authority as he saw fit. Also, because husbands still legally pos-
sessed physical authority over their wives, the courts' general re-
fusal to intervene in the home meant that domestic violence often
went unpunished. 84
In spite of their subordinate role, married women gained some
degree of autonomy by obtaining reforms in "domestic matters,"
such as in housing and sanitation.85 However, advances for mar-
ried women were limited,8 6 and attempts to deviate from tradi-
tional marital roles8 7 were seen as threatening.88
Despite vociferous opposition, married women demanded in-
creased autonomy.89 Participants in the 1848 Women's Rights
Convention in Seneca Falls protested the subordination of women,
84. See LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OwN LIVEs 1 (1988) (explaining that
domestic violence, while rooted in common law tenets, has generally only been recog-
nized as a problem in the last twenty-five years). In 1989, more women suffered
abuse by their husbands than were wed in the same period. STEPHANIE CoONTz, THE
WAY WE NEVER WERE 3 (1992). For a discussion of the ways in which the legal
concepts of noninterference and privacy have tacitly allowed domestic violence, see
Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973 (1991).
85. 1 WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAw, supra note 12, at 372; see also CARL N. DEGLER,
AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRES-
ENT 26-51 (1980). But see UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 82, at 55 (arguing that "the
privacy of women secluded at home without powers of effective decision-making con-
cerning sex, pregnancy, vocation, and lifestyle has been something of 'an injury got
up as a gift.'").
86. 1 WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAw, supra note 12, at 373. Even most suffrage activ-
ists, as a result of their ideology and reality, focused their efforts on family welfare
policies. This emphasis on domestic matters underscored the fact that "women iden-
tifled their rights with their role as mothers." Id.
87. "[J]udicial language seemed to lapse into near solipsism, as if by refusing to
recognize the separation of interests implicit in the contract of marriage, judges were
recreating marital harmony and unity." Hartog, supra note 58, at 106.
88. Grossberg, supra note 64, at 198-99; see, e.g., 8 WIGMORE, supra note 29,
§ 2228. In 1875, an American lawyer presented the following argument to prevent a
married woman's adverse testimony regarding her husband from being admitted
into evidence:
[A]re we to forget that in what is called the progress of civilization that
idea [of unity in the marriage relation] has been mangled and defaced?
... In 1848 that unity was effectually impaired [by the property stat-
utes].... Once her true sphere was in the domestic circle and around
the hearthstone,... but today by the voice and power of legislation she
is ushered into the busy scenes of life, and becomes an active and in-
dependent actor in all its struggles.
Id. (citing ABBOTT, 2 THE TRIAL OF HENRY WARD BEECHER 87-88 (1875) (alterations
in the original)).
89. See ABRAMovrrz, supra note 64, at 124 (discussing the increasingly vocal dis-
approval of women's activism as indicative of growing tension between women's
work, their place in the home, and traditional symbols of male domination); See also
John Demos, Images of the American Family, Then and Now, in CHANGING IMAGES
OF THE FAMILY 43, 45 (V. Tufte & B. Myerhoff eds., 1979) [hereinafter Images of the
American Family] "After the mid-[nineteenth] century, popular literature on domes-
tic life poured out a long litany of complaints:.., authority was generally disrupted;
... women were more and more restless in their roles as homemakers." Id. at 50.
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and married women in particular.90 In the Convention's Declara-
tion of Sentiments, which was modeled on the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, the participants offered their opinion on the doctrine of
separate spheres and the husband's decision-making authority over
his wife: [[T]he husband] has usurped the prerogative of Jehovah
himself, claiming it as his right to assign for [the wife] a sphere of
action, when that belongs to her conscience and her God."91 The
signers of the Declaration of Sentiments thus sought what law, so-
ciety, religion, and economic constraints historically had withheld
from married women: the ability to decide for themselves what ac-
tions were and were not appropriate. While many of the Declara-
tion's demands were not achieved for years,9 2 the fact that these
women openly demanded changes evidenced the increasing conflict
over women's role in marriage. However, the Declaration of Senti-
ments failed to disturb the deep rooted conception of proper marital
roles. 9
3
Although legal restrictions on married women continued,
some of these restrictions began to break down in the early twenti-
eth century9 4 as more married women entered the professional
work force.95 Economic changes and technological advancements
initiated women's move into the workplace.96 In addition, women
had increased access to education and decreased emphasis on
90. HOFF, supra note 1, at 136.
91. Id. 2 app. at 384-85 (citing 1848 Declaration of Sentiments (emphasis
added)).
92. For example, signers of the Declaration of Sentiments advocated that women
be given the right to vote. Id. at 384. This right was denied to women for another
seventy years, until 1920. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIX.
93. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 56, at 324 (stating that in the nineteenth cen-
tury, Americans took for granted the husband's right to direct his wife).
94. See, e.g., WmLysT-m GOODSELL, A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY
467 (1934). In 1892, for example, a majority of states had statutes allowing the hus-
band custody over his wife's person. Id. at 467. In contrast, women were simultane-
ously gaining access to higher education, property rights, and increased rights of
guardianship. Id. at 466-73.
95. Coo='rz, supra note 84, at 156. While married women always had worked in
the home, as of 1900, five to nine percent of married women worked professionally.
Id. Many men supported women's exclusion from the labor force because they were
concerned that "women's employment lowered male wage levels" and because the
true occupation of a woman was to provide "counsel, comfort, and consolation" in the
home. ABRAMovrrz, supra note 64, at 119. Nonetheless, women not only entered the
work place but also became activists. As early as 1825 women workers organized
and protested their wages and working conditions. Id. at 124.
96. CooNTZ, supra note 84, at 157. As the industrial revolution matured, more
jobs in the workplace opened up for women. Id. Moreover, advances in household
technology, such as mass production of food and clothing, allowed women more au-
tonomy. Id. The industrial revolution utilized women as part of the labor market;
however, it also served to reformulate a "gender division of labor and the ideology
supporting women's subordination." AsRAmovTz, supra note 64, at 127.
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childbearing,97 making it easier for them to function in the profes-
sional workplace. 98 Finding paid work created options for both sin-
gle and married women that had not existed before. Married
women were no longer solely dependent on their husbands for eco-
nomic support. 99 Professional work thus helped married women
become independent of their husbands.100
By the 1920s, the social stigma against married women partic-
ipating in the paid labor force had decreased.1o' With the in-
creased numbers of working married women,' 0 2 a few of the legal
restrictions on married women were removed.103 The spousal in-
97. The industrial revolution served to separate the place of work from the home.
BLOOD & WoLFE, supra note 6, at 3. "As a result, the members of the family no
longer worked together and... children became an economic liability instead of an
asset." Id. Moreover, "the average number of children born to a woman who sur-
vived menopause fell from 4.24 in 1880 to 3.56 in 1900 and to 3.17 by 1920."
CooNTz, supra note 84, at 157.
"[I]n the American democracy the improvement in the status of women - espe-
cially married women - has been synchronous with their higher education." Good-
sell, supra note 94, at 467. The increased availability of education for women did not
stem from an effort to equalize the position of men and women. COr, supra note 80,
at 105. Rather, early proponents of education for women thought it could transform
a woman into "an agreeable companion[,] .... wife, mother, wielder not of public
power but of private influence and morality." Id. (citing BENJAMIN RUSH, THOUGHTS
UPON FEMALE EDUCATION, ACCOMMODATED TO THE PRESENT STATE OF SOCIETY, MAN-
NERS, AND GOvERNMENT IN THE U.S.A. (Philadelphia: Prichard and Hail, 1787)). This
"utilitarian" approach to the education of women, "centered on their social useful-
ness as daughters, wives and mothers ..... was based on a limited conception of
woman's role." Id. at 108-9. Thus, although empowering, the education of women
"stressted] a certain sexual destiny.... encourag[ing] women to understand gender
as the essential determinant of their lives." Id. at 123.
98. Conceptions about women's abilities hindered this move into the professional
workplace. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). The Muller Court up-
held restrictions that prevented women from working more than ten hours per day
at professional laundries. The Court reasoned that women needed to be protected
from taxing their physical strength not only for their own benefit but also because
"healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring." Id. at 421. The Court sup-
ported its protectionist stance toward women by comparing them to minors who also
required "especial care." Id.
99. BLOOD & WOLFE, supra note 6, at 3.
100. "There is a world of difference between a wife who works on the farm under
her husband's leadership and the kind of independence gained by working for some-
one else." Id. Married women's work traditionally had focused on fulfilling the
needs of others, especially their husbands. CoTr, supra note 80, at 22.
101. CooiTZ, supra note 84, at 158. The late 1920s also saw an increase in di-
vorce, with more than one in six marriages ending in divorce. 1 WOMEN IN AMERICAN
LAw, supra note 12, at 290,
102. During the 1930's, as men took wage cuts or were laid off, the percentage of
married women in the female labor force increased from 29 percent in the 1920s to
35.5 percent in the 1930's. CooNrz, supra note 84, at 158. For a brief discussion of
how married women's ability to control their property reflects their marital roles, see
supra note 41 and accompanying text.
103. By the 1930s, for example, married women possessed the legal capability to




competency doctrine was invalidated, allowing married women to
choose whether to testify for their husbands.104 In addition, while
husbands rarely were legally sanctioned for physically abusing
their wives, the law no longer granted them this "privilege."O5
The increase in married women's economic and legal power
was interpreted as a very real threat to marriage and family.106
Married women's financial independence was considered danger-
ous, because it was thought to loosen the ties that confined married
women to the home.1O7 Despite the economic opportunities that
now existed for married women,108 they remained legally
subordinate to their husbands.
C. The New Unpredictability
"Time was... when domestic life established sound patterns of au-
thority which served to guarantee an orderly society.l0 9
As the twentieth century progressed, married women contin-
ued to enter the paid labor force in increasing numbers.110 By
104. The Court abolished the spousal incompetency doctrine for use in federal
courts in Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933). The Court reasoned that the
doctrine was no longer necessary due to cross-examination and better educated ju-
ries. The Court failed to note that the doctrine, which was founded on the belief that
the wife's interests mirrored her husband's, had historically functioned to silence
wives. A majority of states also no longer recognize this doctrine. McCoRMicK,
supra note 30, § 66.
105. BAER, supra note 78, at 125.
106. A commentator in 1897 described the popular sentiment that:
tihe growing demand for female labor... is an insidious assault upon
the home; it is the knife of the assassin, aimed at the family circle -
the divine injunction. It debars the man, through financial embarrass-
ment from family responsibility, and physically, mentally and socially
excludes woman equally from nature's dearest impulse....
Edward O'Donnell, Women as Breadwinners - the Error of the Age, in 1 WOMEN IN
AMERICAN LAW, supra note 12, at 299.
Writing in 1934, Professor Goodsell commented that "[plerhaps the characteris-
tic of the twentieth-century family that most sharply challenges the attention... is
its instability." GOODSELL, supra note 94, at 481. Changes in marital roles continue
to evoke anxiety over the fate of the family. See infra note 117.
107. GOODSELL, supra note 94, at 461.
108. E.g., GOODSELL, supra note 94, at 470-71 (discussing community property,
contract rights and a wife's entitlement to her earnings).
109. Oliver J. Bjorksten & Thomas J. Stewart, Contemporary Trends in American
Marriage, in MARnIAGE & DIVORCE 1, 3 (Carol C. Nadelson & Derek C. Polonsky
eds., 1984).
110. During World War II, for example, the female labor force increased by over
fifty percent; three-fourths of these new workers were married. Coorz, supra note
84, at 159. Additionally, after the war many men remained in the military. This
fact combined with the expansion of consumer industries caused demand for women
workers to soar. Id. at 160. The demand for women workers exceeded the supply,
leading to an increase in real wages for women. Id. "Rising real wages in women's
industries increased the costs of staying home and provided new incentives for mar-
ried women to work.' Id. at 161.
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1950, the majority of women working were married."ll Married
women's entry into the paid work force was a vital factor in the
reshaping of marital roles that occurred and accelerated in the lat-
ter half of the twentieth century.112
Today, marital roles remain unequal, albeit not as drastically
as in the past. One reason for this continued imbalance is eco-
nomic. The spouse with the greatest income or financial resources
generally wields the greatest power in marriage."13 As a rule, wo-
men earn less than men. 114 The difference in earnings means that
husbands tend to be advantaged economically and therefore possess
more decision-making authority."15
While an equalization in earnings may remedy the imbalance
somewhat, two remaining obstacles block the path toward balanced
marital roles. First, traditional marital roles have always imposed
very distinct, well-defined duties on husbands and wives.116 These
roles provide both the parties and society1 7 with the security of
unchanging and unambiguous modes of marital behavior.11s
111. BLOOD & WOLFE, supra note 6, at 3. While increasing numbers of married
women worked professionally, the early 1950's also witnessed an attempt to give
returning soldiers priority over women in obtaining education and jobs. Wini
Breines, Domineering Mothers in the 1950s: Image and Reality, 8 WOMEN'S STUD.
INr'L F. 601 (1985). These actions were taken in reaction to women's increased
power. Id. at 603.
112. "[T]he American husband's diminishing authority is due in great part to this
steadily increasing proportion of wives who work outside the home." BLOOD &
WoLFE, supra note 6, at 3.
113. PHILLIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES 53 (1983); see
also BAER, supra note 78, at 129.
114. In 1980, women earned sixty-four cents for every dollar that men earned.
THE AMERIcAN WOMAN 1992-93: A STATUS REPORT 350 (Paula Ries & Anne J. Stone
eds., 1992) [hereinafter THE AMERICAN WOMAN]. In 1990, women earned seventy-
two cents for every dollar men earned. Id. Forty-six percent of all women who work
professionally are employed in low paying service and administrative positions. Id.
at 307. In addition, it still seems to be a societal given that husbands should earn
more than wives. See, e.g., Joan E. Rigdon, A Wife's Higher Pay Can Test a Mar-
riage, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 1993, at B1.
115. BLUMSTEIN & ScHwARTz, supra note 113, at 55.
116. See discussion supra parts I.A-B.
117. The arguments to maintain traditional marital roles invariably return to so-
ciety's need to protect the family. See, e.g., Jack Douglas, The Ultimate Cost of the
Retreat from Marriage and Family Life, in THE RETREAT FROM MARRIAGE: CAUSES
AND CONSEQUENCES 55 (Bryce J. Christensen ed., 1990). "The obvious fact is that the
'war on marriage' is now little more than a great many 'mopping up' political opera-
tions ... of the central theatre of the 'war on the family.'" Id. at 61. Despite such
worries about the stability of the institutions of marriage and the family, in 1990 the
majority of adults were married. THE AMERICAN WOMAN, supra note 114, at 247.
Further, married couple families remain the predominant type of family in America.
Id. at 254.
118. One reason these roles furnish such a sense of security is because marriage
traditionally was based at least as much on economic ties as on emotional bonds.
TRANSFORMATION, supra note 51, at 293. Wives generally had far fewer economic
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Newer, more balanced marital roles are less certain and depend on
the interaction between individual husbands and wives rather than
on a preconceived and generic set of marital roles.n 9 While equal-
ity may be gained in more modem marital roles, the sense of stabil-
ity offered by traditional roles is lost.
A second reason unequal marital roles continue is because
they are stubbornly embedded in the American legal system.120
Compared to Blackstone's description of marriage, the law's concep-
tion of marriage over the last thirty years represents a radical move
toward acceptance and approval of more balanced roles in mar-
riage.121 At the same time, however, courts and legislatures persist
in ruling and legislating based on the common law conception of
unequal marital roles.122 In doing so, courts and legislatures
options, and thus were more likely to remain within the confines of their prescribed
role. BLOOD & WOLFE, supra note 6, at 3. These economic ties are not as vital in
modem marriage because women now are more able to financially support them-
selves. Id. Marital roles now rest more on emotional ties and therefore seem less
secure. TRANSFORMATION, supra note 51, at 293.
119. See, e.g., Bjorksten & Stewart, supra note 109, at 52 (noting that in modem
marriages, decisions tend to be based on negotiation).
120. See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981). As late as 1981, a Loui-
siana statute named the husband as the head and master of property jointly owned
with his wife. Id. This statute, which allowed the husband to mortgage the property
without his wife's consent or notice, was struck down by the Court on equal protec-
tion grounds. Id.
In 1983, a California municipal court still asked female, but not male, potential
jurors about their marital status and their husbands' occupation. Bobb v. Municipal
Court, 143 Cal. App. 3d 860 (1983). In striking down this line of questioning, the
reviewing court stated that these questions were a "relic of a bygone age when wo-
men were presumed incapable of independent thought." Id. at 866.
121. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). The Court stated that
"the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own,
but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional
makeup." Id. at 453. This statement is misleading in that it fails to acknowledge
that the "mind and heart" traditionally recognized by marriage law was not that of
the couple but that of the husband. Despite this oversight, however, the Court
seemed to validate a more equal conception of marriage and marital roles in that the
husband's as well as the wife's independence is recognized and accepted. But see
John T. Noonan, Jr., The Family and the Supreme Court, 23 CATH. U.L. REv. 255
(1973) (criticizing the Court's conception of marriage in Eisenstadt).
United States v. Dege, 364 U.S. 51 (1960) officially invalidated the "one legal
person" conception of marriage when the Court ruled that a husband and wife are
legally capable of the crime of conspiracy. To maintain the fiction of one legal person
would be to accept "medieval views regarding the legal status of woman." Id. at 52.
The Court deemed these "view[s] of American womanhood offensive to the ethos of
our society." Id. at 53. In addition, while some laws still require that the wife main-
tain the home, take her husband's name, or live where he chooses to establish domi-
cile, these laws would fail to survive judicial scrutiny. BAER, supra note 78, at 128.
122. "As people grow up under a husband-dominant system, they come to take
that balance of power for granted - and even to feel that it is right." BLOOD & WOLFE,
supra note 6, at 14; see also BLuMsTIlN & ScHwARTz, supra note 113, at 56 (finding
that the tradition of granting husbands more authority within marriage continues to
skew the balance of power in marriages in favor of husbands). One reason these
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demonstrate that the common law's prejudice toward married wo-
men continues. Part II analyzes the confidential communication
privilege in evidence law and Part III discusses the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey 123 concern-
ing the husband notification requirements, in order to illustrate the
ongoing problem of courts' and legislatures' antipathy toward al-
lowing women an equal role in marriage.
II. The Confidential Communication Privilege and
Common Law Conceptions of Marital Roles
"[it hath beene resolved by the Justices that a wife cannot be pro-
duced either against or for her husband, quia sunt duae animae in
care una (for they are two souls in one flesh), and it might be a
cause of implacable discord and dissention betweene the husband
and the wife, and a meane of great inconvenience."124
Just as American common law adopted England's common law
on marriage, American common law also adopted two types of mari-
tal privileges commonly recognized by English courts: the adverse
testimony privilege and the confidential communication privi-
lege.125 Federal courts continue to recognize both privileges.126
roles have been viewed as proper is due to the general conception of married women
as less capable and untrustworthy. See supra parts L.A and B generally. This dis-
trust toward women continues, as evidenced in the confidential communication priv-
ilege and the dissenting opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791
(1992) (plurality opinion). See infra parts II and III.B.
Many women continue to accept the correctness of these unequal marital roles.
In 1977, for example, a majority of both men and women polled believed that a wo-
man's place was in the home. Rita J. Simon & Jean M. Landis, Women's and Men's
Attitudes about a Woman's Place, 53 Pus. OPINION Q. 265, 268 (1989). In the mid-
1980's, a majority of women polled believed that a married woman may have a ca-
reer so long as her career "remains within the boundaries imposed by the career of
her husband." Id.
A more equal distribution of marital power is an idea that has only taken root in
the last thirty years. See, e.g., TRANSFORMATION, supra note 51, at 88 (noting that
until the 1960's, almost all legislative attempts to regulate family decision-making
granted husbands the dominant role). As recently as 1974, husbands continued to
be recognized as head of the household and wives continued to be held responsible
for domestic and child care services in many states. Lenore J. Weitzman, Legal Reg-
ulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CALF. L. REv. 1169, 1173 (1974).
Modern teenage dating roles may be changing from traditional dating roles,
however. See, e.g., Anne C. Roark, New Rules for Teen Love, L.A. Tim s, Jan. 2,
1993, at B1 (reporting that at one Los Angeles high school, teenage women are much
more likely than their mothers and grandmothers were to ask teenage men out on
dates and are also more likely to share dating expenses). This change in premarital
behavior may have a later equalizing effect on marital roles.
123. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
124. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 29, § 2227 (quoting Lord Coke from A Commentarie
Upon Littleton 6b 1628).




Although virtually all states recognize the confidential communica-
tion privilege, only a slight majority of the states recognize the ad-
verse testimony privilege. 12 7 Both privileges are thought to foster
marital unity.128 The privileges historically have been vested in
the defendant, who generally was the husband,129 meaning that he
decided whether his wife could speak or if she must be silent. Both
privileges thus traditionally premised marital unity on the hus-
band's authority to silence his wife.
In 1980, in Trammel v. United States,130 the Supreme Court
modified the adverse testimony privilege, as applied in federal
courts, to allow the witness-wifell to decide whether she would
testify against her husband.13 2 Trammel signalled a shift away
from the married woman's subordinate role and accepted that mar-
ried women may competently and independently exercise decision-
making authority. However, the Trammel Court expressly noted
that its alteration of the adverse testimony privilege did not affect
126. Emerging Problems under the Rules, (2nd ed., 1991) reprinted in Federal
Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates 217, 296 (1991) [herein-
after Emerging Problems).
127. Id. at 296 n.50.
128. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
129. For authorities stating that the holders of the adverse testimony privilege
historically have been defendant-husbands, see supra part I.A, note 37 and accompa-
nying text. For confirmation of the same regarding holders of the confidential com-
munication privilege, see 8 WiGMORE, supra note 29, § 2333.
The overwhelming prevalence of male defendants has continued into the present
era. For example, in 1930, there were 150,000 male inmates and 5,000 female in-
mates in state and federal prisons. 1990 DEPT. JUST. SOURCEBOOK CRIM. JUST. STAT.
602. In 1970, there were 200,000 male inmates and 7,000 female inmates. Id. In
1990, there were approximately 365,000 male inmates and 37,000 female inmates in
locally administered jails. Id. at 578.
130. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
131. Because this article argues that in the overwhelming majority of cases both
privileges have allowed husbands, as defendants, to silence wives, as witnesses, the
non-neutral gender terms of defendant-husband and witness-wife are used.
132. Trammel presented the issue of whether Mrs. Trammel, an unindicted co-
conspirator, could voluntarily present adverse testimony against her husband in a
drug case. The Court dismissed the notion that preventing a wife from testifying
would promote marital unity. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 52. The Court also noted the
historical impact of the privilege on married women, stating that "[n]owhere... is a
woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and
the dignity associated with recognition as a whole human being." Id. This decision
has received some criticism. See, e.g., Lempert, supra note 31, at 736 (stating that
the adverse testimony privilege "is an important symbolic statement of our attitude
toward marriage").
The Trammel decision changed the adverse testimony privilege only with re-
spect to federal courts. In certain actions, such as diversity suits, federal courts ap-
ply the pertinent state's rules on the privilege. At the time of Trammel, sixteen
states vested this privilege in both spouses or in the defendant-husband alone.
Trammel, 445 U.S. at 49 n.9. Nine states vested the privilege in the witness-wife.
Id. Some states in the former group have altered the privilege to conform to Tram-
mel. See, e.g., HAw. REv. STAT. § 626-1, Evid. Rule 505(a) (1985).
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the confidential communications privilege,' 3 3 which either the de-
fendant-husband or the witness-wife may invoke. 134 The Court
failed to recognize that the confidential communication privilege re-
quired a similar modification.
Trammel evidenced the judiciary's current schizophrenic ap-
proach to marital roles.135 On the one hand, the Trammel Court's
modification of the adverse testimony privilege represented the ju-
diciary's move toward more balanced marital roles;136 on the other
hand, the Court's failure to also remedy the confidential communi-
cation privilege illustrates the judiciary's failure to forcefully pur-
sue and excise all vestiges of common law marital roles. Courts and
legislatures should complete the advances that Trammel began by
modifying the confidential communication privilege to ensure that
marital unity is no longer premised on a married woman's silence.
133. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 45 n.5. The Supreme Court has consistently upheld
the confidential communication privilege. See, e.g., Blau v. United States, 340 U.S.
332 (1951); Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934).
The privilege, which applies in both civil and criminal cases, currently is recog-
nized by statute or by common law in most states. James H. Feldman & Carolyn S.
Reed, Silences in the Storm: Testimonial Privileges in Marital Disputes, 21 FAM L.Q.
189, 236 (1987). For examples of some representative statutes, see N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 8-56, 57(C) (1991); MIcH. CoMe. LAws § 600-2162 (1986); W. VA. CODE § 57-3-4
(1966). The Federal Rules of Evidence do not expressly recognize this privilege.
Rather, the Federal Rules provide that federal courts interpret common law-based
privileges in light of the courts' "reason and experience." FED. R. EvID. 501. Federal
courts generally recognize the privilege. McCoRmcr, supra note 30, at § 78.
134. Emerging Problems, supra note 126, at 298. Although currently either
spouse may invoke the privilege in many states, it is important to recognize how this
arrangement actually affects the parties. The witness-wife's desire to testify against
her husband regarding their confidential communications can be entirely frustrated
by the defendant-husband's excercise of the privilege. Despite the attempt to give
the witness-wife more control over her testimony by allowing her to invoke the privi-
lege, the fact remains that so long as the defendant-husband also holds the privilege
he will be able to control and silence her.
135. This same type of schizophrenic or fractured approach exists in the Court's
five to four decision regarding the husband notification requirement in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). See infra part III.
136. Much of the criticism of the Trammel decision focused on whether married
women's testimony could actually be voluntary or whether these women were vul-
nerable to being manipulated by the prosecution into testifying. See, e.g., Lempert,
supra note 31, at 734 implying that married women would be too weak-willed to
resist being manipulated. For another example of this ongoing perception of married
women as being inherently less capable and irrational, see generally infra part III.B.
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A A Different Critique of the Privilege - A Privilege to
Remain Silenced?
"No man would be willing to have his wife called on in a court of
justice to detail the facts of which she gains a knowledge by reason
of the fact that she is the companion of his privacy[.]"137
Courts, legislatures, and commentators routinely recite that
the confidential communication privilege18S encourages marital
confidences which in turn foster unity between husband and
wife.139 The privilege is justified on utilitarian grounds, meaning
that the benefits derived from protecting the marriage outweigh the
privilege's detrimental effect on fact-finding.140 This justification
explicitly recognizes two interests: protection of the marital rela-
tionship and the need for accurate fact-finding. The husband's in-
terest is implicitly respected because the current application of the
privilege, as well as its historical roots, indicate that the privilege's
role in protecting marital unity is traditionally synonymous with
protecting the husband's authority.141
Criticism of this privilege has focused on the limited interests
included in the utilitarian equation. For example, no proof exists to
show that the privilege fosters marital confidences and marital
137. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 29, § 2332, (citing State ex rel Barker v. McAuley, 51
Tenn. 424, 432 (1871)).
138. Three requirements must be met in order for the privilege to apply. First,
the marriage must be legal. JACK B. WEnSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, 2 WEIN-
sTEn 's EVIDENCE § 505[04] (1992). Some jurisdictions extend the privilege to com-
mon law marriages. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 616 A.2d 1216 (D.C. 1992).
Other jurisdictions require a more formal marriage. See, e.g., People v. Suarez, 560
N.Y.S.2d 68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992). Second, there must be a communication, such as a
written or verbal expression or a communicative act. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra
§ 505[04]; see also Brown v. State, 404 S.E.2d 469 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that
defendant-husband who removed cocaine from district attorney's office while defend-
ant's wife was present had not made an expressive communication). Third, the com-
munication must have been made in private, outside the presence of any third party.
WEINSTEIN & BERGERSUpra § 505[04]. For an interesting case concerning this last
requirement, see State v. Holmes, 398 S.E.2d 873 (N.C. App. 1990).
139. 8 WiGMoRE, supra note 29, § 2332 ("[Tlhe policy which should lie at the foun-
dation of every rule of privileged communications... appears to be satisfied in the
privilege for communications between husband and wife."); see also State v. Webb,
824 P.2d 1257, 1261 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992); Steven F. Gofman, Note, "Honey, the
Judge Says We're History": Abrogating the Marital Privileges via Modern Doctrines
of Marital Worthiness, 77 CoRNELL L. REv. 843 (1992) (arguing validity of both mari-
tal privileges); Husband-Wife Privileges, supra note 34 (arguing efficacy of the confi-
dential communication privilege). But see MCCORMICK, supra note 30, § 86
(questioning the efficacy of the privilege).
140. Cf. McComciCK, supra note 30, § 86 (arguing that the benefits of the confi-
dential communication are doubtful, and the injustice of suppressing relevant evi-
dence is clear and certain).
141. "The utilitarian rationale suggests that privileges were created to protect
men...." Kit Kinports, Evidence Engendered, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 413, 440.
1993] 249
Law and Inequality
unity. 142 Critics also question why the privilege endures beyond
the life of the marriage if the privilege's purpose is to promote mari-
tal unity.1 43 However, the standard critique of the privilege re-
mains oblivious to an especially pressing criticism: the interest of
the married woman, the party most often silenced by the privilege,
has not been considered.144
The privilege recalls the common law's unequal marital roles
in two important respects. First, the privilege is reminiscent of the
law's tradition of noninterference in domestic matters. Noninter-
ference historically allowed wife abuse,145 and the privilege contin-
ues to tacitly allow this abuse today. For example, while the
privilege extends only to expressive acts or communications,
threats made by the husband to the wife fall within the privilege in
some states.14 6 In addition, while violent acts generally are not
covered by the privilege, 14 7 the husband's statements to the wife
regarding those actions generally are covered.148 Therefore, be-
cause the privilege is vested in the defendant-husband, the wife
sometimes will be prevented from testifying about her husband's
142. McCoRmicK, supra note 30, § 86 (noting the doubtful assumption that
spouses will know of this privilege and take it into account when communicating
privately); see also Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on
the Law of Evidence: Family Relations, 13 MwN. L. REv. 675, 682 (1929) ("Marital
harmony among lawyers who know about the privileged communications is not
vastly superior to that of other professional groups.").
143. McCoRMicK, supra note 30, § 86. For a case illustrating the peculiarity of
extending the privilege even after the marriage has ended, see People v. Vermeulen,
438 N.W.2d 36 (Mich. 1989). Vermeulen concerned a husband's statement made to
his first wife after he had filed for divorce and already remarried. Id. at 37 n.4.
Because the husband and first wife officially were still married at the time of the
communication, the first wife was prevented from testifying in the husband's murder
trial.
144. "[Ilt is remarkable that so far the law of evidence has been relatively un-
touched by recent ideological fashions.... Feminists... have generally ignored the
law of evidence." Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., What's the Matter with Evidence?, 25
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 773, 779 (1992).
As with the notification requirement discussed infra part III, this privilege
treats married women differently from single women. Again, the law imposes a bur-
den on some women simply because they are married.
145. See supra parts L.A and B, notes 26-27 and 83-84 and accompanying text.
146. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 5.60.060(1) (1963) (privilege fails to make an
exception for threats of violence); see also Cavert v. State, 14 S.W.2d 735, 739 (Tenn.
1929). But see State v. Richards, 391 S.E.2d 354, 358-59 (W. Va. 1990) (privilege
does not extend to husband's threatening statements to wife); State v. Zabijak, 280
N.W. 149 (Mich. 1938) (same).
147. See, e.g., WAH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(1) (1963) (privilege makes an exception
for acts of violence in the marriage but not for threats of violence); MD. CODE ANN.,
[CTs. & JuD. PRoc.] § 9-105 (1989) (no exceptions included in the statutory lan-
guage); W. VA. CODE § 57-3-4 (1966) (same).
148. See, e.g., State v. Enriquez, 609 A.2d 343 (Md. 1992). For a discussion of
Enriquez, see infra note 150 and accompanying text.
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violence toward her.149 Any marital unity achieved in these situa-
tions is directly premised on a wife's physical subordination to her
husband.
Further, the privilege acts as one factor in creating a legal
landscape in which a husband's violence against his wife is permit-
ted. The privilege is usually inapplicable to threats in the course of
or in furtherance of crimes against the wife. However, by granting
the husband the right to prevent his wife from testifying about
statements made outside the actual violence, but which relate to
the violence, the privilege makes it less likely that the husband will
be punished, and thus more likely that he will continue to threaten
and abuse his wife.
For example, in a 1992 Maryland case, State v. Enriquez, a
husband was convicted of second-degree sexual offense and battery
for an attack he allegedly committed against his wife.150 Mike Mer-
cado Enriquez forced his wife to engage in nonconsensual vaginal
and anal intercourse for approximately three hours.15' Levina En-
riquez required medical attention the next day due to lacerations
and bleeding.152 She moved out of their home and obtained assist-
ance from a Crisis Center.153 Ten days later, her husband called to
apologize for the attack, ask for a reconciliation, and tell her that he
was receiving treatment. 54 Levina Enriquez testified about the
content of the telephone conversation. The Court of Special Ap-
peals, and the Court of Appeals reversed his conviction and ordered
a new trial on the grounds that it was not harmless error to allow
the wife to include "privileged marital communications" in her
testimony.' 55
149. The privilege also can harm other family members. See, e.g., People v.
Hamacher, 438 N.W.2d 43 (Mich. 1989) (privilege used to prevent wife from testify-
ing concerning husband's statement to her regarding his sexual abuse of wife's eight-
year-old daughter). But see State v. Sanders, 833 P.2d 452 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992)
(privilege cannot be used to prevent wife's testimony concerning husband's state-
ments encouraging her to leave jurisdiction before he was tried on charges of sexual
abuse of her daughter; public policy of preventing child abuse found to outweigh use
of the privilege).
150. 609 A.2d 343. The defendant was sentenced to seven years imprisonment,
but all of it, save eighteen months, was suspended. Id. at 344. Ultimately, the con-





155. The court based the Enriquez decision on Coleman v. State, 380 A.2d 49 (Md.
1977), in which a wife testified that her husband told her where stolen goods were




The confidential communication privilege also recalls the com-
mon law marital role in another important respect. Historically,
married women have been denied decision-making authority in the
marriage and have been equated with populations perceived to be
less capable.156 Common law granted authority to husbands, who
were regarded as trustworthy guardians.I5 7 The confidential com-
munication privilege remains vested in the defendant-husband at
least partly because courts and legislatures continue implicitly to
regard husbands as inherently more responsible and rational. Mar-
ried women, therefore, continue to be denied decision-making au-
thority because of beliefs regarding their competence.' 58 Denial of
this authority is harmful in two ways. First, on a day-to-day level,
the refusal to permit married women to decide whether to testify
affects the course of women's lives and their children's lives. Sec-
ond, the denial of decision-making authority to women publicly pro-
claims that courts and legislatures consider married women
inherently and hopelessly incompetent.
The privilege also works to the very real detriment of the wo-
man who is no longer married. For example, if an ex-husband and
an ex-wife are both defendants, the ex-wife cannot testify against
her ex-husband regarding their confidential communications dur-
ing the marriage in exchange for a plea bargain. If the confidential
communication privilege was only concerned with protecting mari-
tal confidences and promoting marital unity, then there would be
no reason to forbid an ex-wife from testifying. Rather, the refusal
to allow testimony, even after the marriage has terminated indi-
cates judicial and legislative anxiety about allowing ex-wives this
amount of authority over themselves and their ex-husbands. Thus,
this privilege curtails a woman's range of legal action even after she
is no longer married.
B. A New Approach
'Just as we have left behind the belief that a woman must consult
her husband before undertaking serious matters .... so we must re-
ject the notion that a woman is less capable of deciding matters of
gravity."159
Courts and legislatures continue to allow defendant-husbands
to invoke the privilege, thus depriving married women of their
156. See generally Part I.
157. See generally Part I.
158. See supra notes 135-136 (discussing criticism on Trammel based on concern
that married women would be manipulated into testifying).
159. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2842 (1992) (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
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choice of whether to testify and in some cases subjecting them to
domestic violence and fear.'60 Courts and legislatures should con-
tinue to grant the privilege. Without the privilege, both husbands
and wives would be compelled to testify regardless of their personal
choice and situation. However, the privilege should be modified in
two ways to ensure that it does not continue to relegate married
women to a low status.
First, and most importantly, the privilege should be vested
solely in the witness-wife, rather than vested in the defendant-hus-
band. As in Trammel,16l this modification would allow the wife,
the party most often silenced, to exercise her decision-making au-
thority. Married women stand in the best position to assess
whether enough marital unity exists to warrant their silence. De-
fendant-husbands will naturally seek refuge in this privilege,
thereby silencing their wives and depriving courts of testimony.
Vesting the privilege in the witness-wife is likely to increase the
amount of key testimony available to the court. This modification
would also signal that courts and legislatures have discarded an-
other archaic notion of married women's silent and subordinate
role.
Secondly, the privilege should last only as long as the mar-
riage. Continuing to honor the privilege after the marriage has ter-
minated is both futile and harmful. It is futile because society
gains nothing by the use of the privilege in cases where the mar-
riage has ended. Marital unity cannot be preserved in a defunct
marriage. The privilege's use after marital termination is harmful
because it silences needed testimony and severely curtails the ex-
wife's sphere of action. In considering this change, courts and legis-
latures should also assess whether the privilege should be tolled
once divorce proceedings have commenced. Again, in the case of
divorce proceedings, there is little marital unity to protect. Fur-
ther, divorce proceedings may provoke episodes of domestic vio-
lence, making it even more necessary that the witness-wife be
allowed to testify if she chooses.
Taken together, these two modifications preserve what is val-
uable in the privilege, and they terminate the malevolence the priv-
ilege has wrought and perpetuates. Marriage, based on both
parties' equal status, is protected because neither spouse is com-
pelled to testify regarding confidential communications. At the
same time, the alterations ensure that courts and legislators can no
160. State v. Enriquez, 609 A.2d 343 (Md. 1992); see supra text accompanying
notes 150-155.
161. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
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longer use the privilege to pursue a common law conception of mari-
tal unity dependent upon severely unequal marital roles.
Part III of the article discusses a very recent example of this
same type of attempt by courts and legislatures to premise marital
unity on unequal marital roles reminiscent of Blackstone's era.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey,162 a 1992 decision, illustrates the
very strong disagreement within the Supreme Court over the status
of women in marriage. This disagreement again signals that while
to some degree courts have freed themselves of antiquated discrimi-
natory views, a disturbingly large and powerful population in the
courts remains mired in the common law past.
M. Planned Parenthood v. Casey - An Insight into the
Court's Fractured Views on Marital Roles
"In order to further the Commonwealth's interest in promoting the
integrity of the marital relationship .... no physician shall perform
an abortion on a married woman,. . . unless he or she has received a
signed statement ... that [the married woman] has notified her
spouse that she is about to undergo an abortion."163
From Roe v. Wade,1 64 decided almost twenty years ago, to the
present day, a woman's power to make decisions regarding her
pregnancy has been an ongoing issue before the Court.165 In Roe,
the Court expressly left open the issue of the father's role in his
wife's decision to terminate her pregnancy.166 Three years later, in
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,167 the Court struck down a re-
quirement in Missouri's abortion statute that mandated married
women receive their husbands' consent before obtaining an abor-
tion.168 In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,169 the Court, divided five
to four, invalidated Pennsylvania's attempt to compel a wife to no-
162. 112 S. Ct. 2791.
163. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3209 (1983 & Supp. 1991). For the text of this
notification requirement, see infra note 174.
164. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
165. See infra notes 168-173 and accompanying text.
166. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165 n.67.
167. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
168. The Court reasoned that because the state could not veto a woman's decision
in the first trimester, the state could not grant this veto power to the husband. Id. at
69. An additional reason, given by Justices Blackmun, Stewart, and Powell, was
that because the view of only one spouse could prevail, the woman's decision should
be honored. Id. at 90. These justices reached this conclusion on the ground that the
woman is the most intimately affected by the pregnancy and birth. Id.
169. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). At issue in Casey were five provisions of the Penn-
sylvania abortion statute. This article focuses on the notification requirement of the
statute and adds findings from other portions of the decision only as necessary to
clarify discussion of the notification requirement.
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tify her husband before ending the pregnancy. 170 The sections be-
low analyze the ways in which the majority and dissenting
opinions, respectively, differ from and recall traditional common
law views of a married woman's subordinate status. This analysis
illustrates that the Supreme Court remains closely divided on
whether women merit equal status in marriage. 17 '
A. Undue Burdens: The Majority's Divergence from
Common Law Marital Roles
"Section 3209 embodies a view of marriage consonant with the com-
mon-law status of married women but repugnant to our present un-
derstanding of marriage[.] " 172
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority on this issue, 173 de-
termined that Pennsylvania's notification requirement 174 consti-
170. The district court termed the notification requirement "the most problem-
atic" requirement in Pennsylvania's abortion statute, and invalidated it using the
strict scrutiny test. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1384 (E.D. Pa.
1990), confirmed in part and overruled in part, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), con-
firmed in part and overruled in part, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). A panel on the court of
appeals (divided by a vote of two to one) used the undue burden test in finding that
the notification requirement was unconstitutional. Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991).
171. At the time of the Court's decision, three lower federal court decisions had
found similar notification requirements unconstitutional. Planned Parenthood v.
Bd. of Medical Review, 598 F. Supp. 625 (D.R.I. 1984); Eubanks v. Smith, 604 F.
Supp. 141 (W.D. Ky. 1984); Scheinberg v. Smith, 482 F. Supp. 529 (S.D. Fla. 1979),
affd in part and vacated and remanded on other grounds in part, 659 F.2d 476 (5th
Cir. 1981), on remand, 550 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D. Fla. 1982). The Scheinberg case is
interesting in that the reviewing court determined that the notification requirement
could stand if the state could show that the abortion procedure would hinder a mar-
ried woman's future ability to bear children and therefore harm the husband's right
to procreate within the marriage.
172. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2831.
173. In addition to Justice O'Connor, the majority was made up of Justices Sou-
ter, Kennedy, Stevens, and Blackmun. The invalidation of the notification require-
ment was the only substantive decision to garner a majority.
174. Pennsylvania's notification requirement reads as follows:
Section 3209. Spousal Notice. (a) Spousal notice required. - In order to
further the Commonwealth's interest in promoting the integrity of the
marital relationship and to protect a spouse's interests in having chil-
dren within marriage and in protecting the prenatal life of that spouse's
child, no physician shall perform an abortion on a married woman, ex-
cept as provided in subsections (b) and (c), unless he or she has received
a signed statement, which need not be notarized, from the woman upon
whom the abortion is to be performed, that she has notified her spouse
that she is about to undergo an abortion. The statement shall bear a
notice that any false statement made therein is punishable by law. (b)
Exceptions. - The statement certifying the notice required by subsec-
tion (a) has been given need not be furnished where the woman pro-
vides the physician a signed statement certifying at least one of the
following:
(1) Her spouse is not the father of the child.
(2) Her spouse, after diligent effort, could not be located.
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tuted an undue burden. 175 In doing so, she considered the interests
of the married woman,176 the husband,177 and the state.178 The
deciding factor as to which of these competing interests should be
vindicated was Justice O'Connor's palpable unease with the com-
mon law marital roles which the husband notification require-
ment 179  sought to impose. Justice O'Connor presented two
(3) The pregnancy is a result of spousal sexual assault as described
in section 3128 (relating to spousal sexual assault), which has been re-
ported to a law enforcement agency having the requisite jurisdiction.
(4) The woman has reason to believe that the furnishing of notice to
her spouse is likely to result in the infliction of bodily injury upon her
by her spouse or by another individual. Such statement need not be
notarized, but shall bear a notice that any false statements made
therein are punishable by law. (c)Medical emergency. - The require-
ments of subsection (a) shall not apply in case of a medical emergency.
(d) Forms. - The department shall cause to be published, forms which
may be utilized for purposes of providing the signed statements re-
quired by subsections (a) and (b). The department shall distribute an
adequate supply of such forms to all abortion facilities in this Common-
wealth. (e) Penalty; civil action. - Any physician who violates the pro-
visions of this section is guilty of 'unprofessional conduct,' and his or
her license for the practice of medicine and surgery shall be subject to
suspension or revocation .... In addition, any physician who know-
ingly violates the provisions of this section shall be civilly liable to the
spouse who is the father of the aborted child for any damages caused
thereby and for punitive damages in the amount of $5,000, and the
court shall award a prevailing plaintiff a reasonable attorney fee as
part of costs.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3209 (1983 & Supp. 1991).
175. In a previous section of the opinion, Justice O'Connor established the undue
burden test as the means of determining whether requirements of this abortion stat-
ute could withstand constitutional scrutiny. 112 S. Ct. at 2820. An undue burden
exists if "a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." Id.
176. Justice O'Connor recognized that the Court has "respected the private realm
of family life which the state cannot enter." Id. at 2807 (quoting Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)). The married woman's interests are at stake because
pregnancy-related 'choices tare] central to personal dignity and autonomy...." Id.
177. The husband's interests are implicated because he has "a 'deep and proper
concern and interest ... in his wife's pregnancy and in the growth and development
of the fetus she is carrying.'" Id. at 2830 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976)). Neither the majority nor the dissent made much of the fact
that the husband may not be the father of the fetus. Paternity rights thus were not
as much at issue as the rights that marriage grants to husbands. The importance of
marital rights and roles becomes even clearer when one considers whom the hus-
band notification requirement does not affect: single pregnant women. These women
would not be compelled to notify their partners. While seeking to promote marital
unity, the state may instead provide women with a disincentive to marry.
178. The state possesses legitimate interest in maternal health and in the poten-
tial life of the fetus. 112 S. Ct. at 2804.
179. This article refers to the "husband notification requirement" rather than the
.spousal notification requirement" in order to make clear that the wife, not the wife
and the husband, is the party compelled by the requirement. As written by the
Pennsylvania Legislature, the notification requirement is a gender-neutral require-
ment that imposes duties on both wife and husband. For example, read indepen-
dently of the body of the requirement provision, the title "Spousal notification,"
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arguments against the requirement: first, the exceptions were too
narrowly tailored; second, that the requirement failed to meet its
stated purpose of achieving marital unity.o8 0 Both arguments were
founded on a conception of marital roles that sharply diverged from
historical common law.
In the first part of her analysis, Justice O'Connor provided a
lengthy list from the district court's findings of fact concerning the
incidence and characteristics of domestic violence.181 In doing so,
Justice O'Connor illustrated an awareness of the grave and ongoing
problems that stem from husbands' historical power to physically
discipline their wives. She noted that the notification requirement
failed to evidence this same awareness.1 8 2 Justice O'Connor's dis-
course on physical violence recognizes that domestic violence has
historically allowed husbands an almost limitless amount of au-
thority over their wives.18 3 In finding that the notification of preg-
nancy frequently incites battering and violence within the
family,' 8 4 Justice O'Connor sought to prevent the state from fur-
thering this extremely injurious mode of marital decision-
making.' 8 5
implies situations in which either the wife or husband must notify the other. In
pregnancy-related decisions, however, only the wife has the duty of notification. In
addition, "spouse," as used in the body of the requirement provision, clearly refers
only to the husband. When the wife is referred to, she is named as the married
woman or simply as the woman. This neutral language thus belies the fact that the
notification requirement compels only the wife.
180. The statute speaks of "integrity of the marital relationship" rather than mar-
ital unity. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3209 (1983 & Supp. 1991). However, marital
integrity clearly is synonymous with common law notions of marital unity. There-
fore, this article uses the term "marital unity" in order to highlight the statute's close
kinship to antiquated ideas.
181. A very conservative estimate of domestic violence is that it occurs in two mil-
lion families. 112 S. Ct. at 2826. According to one of the amicus briefs submitted on
behalf of Planned Parenthood, domestic violence is the most prevalent cause of in-
jury to women and accounts for twenty-two percent to thirty-five percent of all emer-
gency room visits by women. Amicus Curaie Brief by the American Psychological
Association in Support of Petitioners at 9 (Nos. 91-744 and 91-902) [hereinafter
American Psychological Association Brief].
182. While the notification requirement allowed an exception for battered wives if
they had reported the crime within ninety days, Justice O'Connor observed that "se-
crecy typically shrouds abusive families. Family members are instructed not to tell
anyone, especially police or doctors, about the abuse and violence." 112 S. Ct. at
2827. In addition, no exception was allowed if the incident was not reported or if the
husband battered the children in an attempt to persuade the wife.
183. As discussed in parts I.B and C, supra, married women's entry into the paid
work force has decreased the husband's overall authority in the marriage. Episodes
of domestic violence can be seen as one way that some husbands attempt to "recap-
ture and enforce older kinds of masculine authority." CMRUSTM STANSELL, CrrY OF
WOMEN 78 (1987).
184. 112 S. Ct. at 2827.
185. It is ironic that while the legal system's principle of noninterference in the
home has tacitly permitted domestic violence, here the Pennsylvania State Legisla-
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Justice O'Connor also was disturbed that the notification re-
quirement failed to make an exception for nonphysical abuse, espe-
cially forced social and economic isolation.186 This uneasiness
evidenced a sensitivity to two factors that historically restricted
married women to very confined roles. First, the fact that the noti-
fication requirement could allow husbands to socially isolate their
wives recalls the unequal marital roles which denied married wo-
men any substantial degree of authority.187 Second, Justice
O'Connor's reference to economic isolation reinforces the historical
importance financial arrangements have played in determining the
allotment of marital authority.188 The Pennsylvania legislators'
failure to craft exceptions that properly addressed cases of physical,
psychological, or economic coercion led Justice O'Connor to find
that the notification requirement essentially functioned the same
as the veto provision found unconstitutional in Danforth.189
Justice O'Connor also argued that the notification require-
ment failed to meet its goal of fostering marital unity. She made
the "common sense" deduction that the requirement was superflu-
ous in healthy marriages where no legislative prodding was re-
quired to promote communication.190 As noted above, however, in
some marriages the notification requirement may engender vio-
ture is interfering in such a way that may prompt domestic violence. One writer,
noting the general tendency of the legal profession to not interfere in marital mat-
ters, nonetheless finds that the law sometimes departs from this approach. Stephen
J. Morse, Family Law in Transition: From Traditional Families to Individual Lib-
erty, in CHANGING IMAGES OF THE FAMILY 334 (Virginia Tufte & Barbara Myerhoff
eds., 1979). The decision to depart from tradition and interfere in the home gener-
ally is prompted by the law's desire to impose "quite traditional and conservative
values' on the marriage. Id.
186. 112 S. Ct. at 2828. Psychological abuse can include insults, threats, destruc-
tion of property in the home, isolation, degradation, surveillance, withholding trans-
portation, and economic reprisal. American Psychological Association Brief, supra
note 181, at 9.
187. In one recent study concerning notification requirements, a participant
stated that she did not want to tell her husband of her decision "'because he'd want
[me] to have the baby' and that 'he would control [me] more than he does now.'"
Barbara Ryan & Eric Plutzer, When Married Women Have Abortions: Spousal Notifi-
cation and Marital Interaction, 51 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 41, 46 (1989) (alterations in
the original).
188. Justice O'Connor failed to note one economic implication that the notice re-
quirement would have even on a harmonious couple because she assumed that, ab-
sent patterns of physical or psychological abuse, couples contribute equally to
decisions. However, husbands generally earn more than their wives and therefore
tend to hold more decision-making authority within the marriage. See supra part
I.C, notes 113-115 and accompanying text. Forcing married women to notify their
husbands subjects these women to the will of the dominant force in the marriage.
189. 112 S. Ct. at 2831.
190. Id. at 2831; see also Ryan & Plutzer, supra note 187, at 41 (finding that




lence and other types of abuse. By allowing the state to decide that
married women, save for a small subset who fit within the notifica-
tion requirement's exceptions, must notify their husbands of their
decision, the state would actually foster marital upset in a number
of marriages. Conversely, by allowing married women to decide
whether they can safely notify their husbands, Justice O'Connor
validated the fact that married women are capable of making this
decision.191
The concept that married women can make such decisions
runs counter to the role that the legal system traditionally has re-
served for them. Justice O'Connor contrasted this relatively recent
judicial recognition of married women's decision-making capabili-
ties 192 with the common law's historically derogatory perception of
married women in justifying why she disapproved of the husband
notification requirement, but approved parental consent and notifi-
cation requirements. She noted that the Court's approval of the lat-
ter requirements rests on the law's assumption that minors benefit
from parental consultation.193 This consultation is beneficial, Jus-
tice O'Connor observed, because parents make decisions with the
child's best interests in mind.194 She recognized that husbands
may not necessarily consider their wives' best interests and there-
fore the husband notification requirement fundamentally differs
from parental consent and notification requirements.195
Justice O'Connor's refusal to validate the husband notification
requirement illustrates two ways in which she found married wo-
men capable of rational decision making and deserving of equal
marital roles. First, unlike historical common law, Justice
O'Connor did not group married women with minors. 196 Second,
her recognition that husbands' best interests do not automatically
mirror their wives' best interests showed that Justice O'Connor had
191. At several points in the opinion, Justice O'Connor pointedly legitimatizes the
fear that the husband notification requirement elicited in many women. For exam-
ple, she refers to these fears as "justifiable" and "reasonable." 112 S. Ct. at 2828-29;
see also Ryan & Plutzer, supra note 187, at 47. "[W]omen in intimate relationships
are capable of making educated guesses concerning the effect notification will have
on the harmony of these relationships." Id.
192. "Only one generation has passed since this Court ... precluded [married
women from] full and independent legal status." 112 S. Ct. at 2831.
193. Id. at 2830.
194. Id.
195, Id.
196. Viewing married women as the equivalent of minors may also contribute to
wife abuse. One writer has noted that husbands may view violence against their
wives in much the same way that parents view the physical disciplining of their
children, "a corrective measure congruent with family loyalties." STANSELL, supra
note 183, at 79.
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abandoned the traditional notion of husbands as guardians for their
wives and the notion that interests within marriage are inevitably
identical.197
B. The Dissent - Echoes of Common Law Views
'In our view, the spousal notice requirement is a rational attempt by
the State to improve truthful communication between spouses and
encourage collaborative decision-making, and thereby fosters mari-
tal integrity."'98
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist 99 claimed to have studied
the interests of the husband,200 the state,20 and the married wo-
man, just as Justice O'Connor did in her opinion.202 The Chief Jus-
tice, however, determined that the husband notification
requirement was constitutional. 20 3 Throughout the dissent, the
Chief Justice failed to focus on, or really even acknowledge, that the
married woman's interest may legitimately differ from her hus-
band's interest.20 4
Chief Justice Rehnquist distinguished the notification require-
ment from the husband's consent requirement held unconstitu-
tional in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth205 by casting husbands
197. "The husband's interest... does not permit the State to empower him with
this troubling degree of authority over his wife. The contrary view leads to conse-
quences reminiscent of the common law." 112 S. Ct. at 2831.
198. 112 S. Ct. at 2871 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
199. The Chief Justice was joined by Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas. Id. at
2855.
200. The husband has an interest in "procreation within the marriage and in the
potential life of his unborn child[.]" 112 S. Ct. at 2871.
201. According to the Chief Justice, the State holds a two-fold interest in protect-
ing the husband's interests in the potential life of the fetus, and in fostering the
integrity of the marriage. Id.
202. The dissent did not detail the nature of the woman's interest but simply
stated that her interest is "a form of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause[]"
Id. at 2867.
203. In making this determination, the Chief Justice subjected the notification
requirement to the rational basis test. Id. at 2867. Applied to the statute in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the rational basis test allows states to regulate abor-
tion in ways that are rationally related to legitimate state interests. Id. (citing Web-
ster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Williamson v. Lee Optical
of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955)).
204. In the portion of the opinion concerning the notification requirement, Chief
Justice Rehnquist did not mention the woman's interest. The Chief Justice dis-
cussed her interest in passing in an earlier part of his opinion. 112 S. Ct. at 2867.
205. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). Then Justice Rehnquist joined Justice White's dissent in
favor of the husband's consent requirement in Danforth. Id.
Danforth's consent requirement is commonly referred to as a spousal consent
requirement. As explained supra part III.A, note 179, this type of gender neutral
language conceals that the requirement only is imposed upon the wife. As with the
husband notification requirement, this article uses nongender neutral language in
order to highlight whom the requirement actually imposes upon.
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into their traditional guardian role and wives into their traditional
subordinate role. While the Chief Justice was reticent in expressly
communicating his conception of women in marriage, his view
nonetheless emerged from his tacit assumptions about married wo-
men's capabilities and maturity, and his analogy of married women
to minors. Chief Justice Rehnquist's general assumption about
married women is not that there are situations in which they re-
quire a degree of autonomy, but that they require consultation with
their husbands in almost all circumstances. 206
In Chief Justice Rehnquist's view, married women's defects in
maturity and reasoning create the need for consultation. For exam-
ple, the Chief Justice noted that some married women "prefer"207
not to notify their husbands because of "perceived" problems in the
marriage.208 The Chief Justice thus evidenced his belief that mar-
ried women proceed based on mere preference or that they act on
ill-founded assumptions. 20 9 This type of almost visceral distrust of
married women's independent decision-making ability recalls com-
mon law notions that married women required guardians to protect
them from themselves and that married women were not accounta-
ble for their crimes because they were incapable of acting
responsibly. 210
Another example of the traditional common law images of
married women is seen in the Chief Justice's oblique analogy of the
husband notification requirement to parental consent and notifica-
tion requirements. 211 He noted that the husband notification re-
206. See infra notes 209-10.
207. 112 S. Ct at 2870 n.2 (emphasis added).
208. Id.
209. The Chief Justice "assumes that every woman who decides to have an abor-
tion does so without serious consideration of the moral implications of their deci-
sion." 112 S. Ct. at 2853 (Blackmun, J., concurring). One reason that Chief Justice
Rehnquist could find that married women prefer not to tell their husbands rather
than that some women emphatically need the option to not inform their husbands is
that his dissent generally ignored the impact of domestic violence in these situa-
tions. See infra notes 221-222 and accompanying text.
210. This current of deep distrust toward married women is even more apparent
in some of the briefs offered to the Court in support of the husband notification re-
quirement. See, e.g., Amicus Curaie Brief by the Rutherford Institute in support of
Respondents at 15, (Nos. 91-704 and 91-902) (observing that one "type of woman who
may not tell her husband... about a decision to abort is the woman who makes a
hasty, impulsive decision"). This brief characterized married women who have abor-
tions without informing their husbands as women who are "liberated," "highly domi-
nant [and] independent." Id. at 13; see also Amicus Curaie Brief by the United
States in support of Respondents at 24 (Nos. 91-744 and 91-902) (hereinafter United
States Brief) (stating that the notification requirement would compel married wo-
men to "rethink a hasty decision").
211. The dissenting judge on the court of appeals panel who voted to uphold the
husband notification requirement also made this analogy between adult married wo-
19931
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quirement "'does not give any third party the legal right to make
the [woman's] decision for her, or to prevent her from obtaining an
abortion should she choose to have one.'" 2 12 This statement was
meant to support the Chief Justice's finding that the requirement
did not act as a veto. However, in quoting from Hodgson v. Minne-
sota,2 13 a case in which the Court upheld parental notice require-
ments, Chief Justice Rehnquist neglected to point out that he had
substituted "woman" in place of "minor" in the original. His placid
exchange of "minor" for "woman" indicates that he equated the two
groups in much the same way that common law and equity histori-
cally equated married women with less capable populations such as
"infants and lunatics."
The Chief Justice's approval of the husband notification re-
quirement stemmed from the same reasoning employed in validat-
ing parental consent and notification requirements: the
requirements are acceptable because they offer a less capable party
help from an inherently more capable party in making a complex
and traumatic decision. Chief Justice Rehnquist's image of married
women thus found them in need of consultation and guidance in
much the same way that Blackstone's era saw married women in
need of their husbands' consultation and guidance.2 14
Chief Justice Rehnquist's image of married women as in need
of aid and protection perhaps may be one reason why, in the second
half of his opinion, which detailed the application of the rational
basis test to the notification requirement, he did not factor the wo-
man's interest into the test.2 15 He did consider the interests of the
State and the husband, which coincided quite neatly2 16 In assess-
ing the husband's interest, the Chief Justice assumed that the
wife's interests mirrored or were subordinate to the husband's in-
terests.2 17 Based on this assumption, which clearly was rooted in
men and minors. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 721 (3d Cir. 1991)
(Alito, J., dissenting). In addition, a number of the briefs offered in support of the
husband notification requirement used this analogy. See, e.g, Brief for Respondents
at 24 (Nos. 91-744 and 91-902); United States Brief, supra note 210, at 22.
212. 112 S. Ct. at 2870 (quoting Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 496 (1990)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (alteration in
the Casey original)).
213. 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
214. An amicus brief offered in support of the husband notification requirement
put it slightly differently. Compelling married women to notify their husbands pre-
vents "a novel intrusion into a settled matrix of family responsibilities." Amicus
Curaie Brief by Focus on the Family et al. in support of Respondents at 16 (Nos. 91-
744 and 91-902). What was at stake, then, was upholding the husband's traditional
position of authority against encroachment by the wife.
215. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, at 2866-72.
216. Id. at 2867-72.
217. Id. at 2869-72.
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common law conceptions of unequal husband and wife roles,2 18 the
Chief Justice saw no need to inquire about the woman's interests
independent of her husband.
In assuming that the husband acts in his wife's best inter-
ests,2 19 the Chief Justice was able to avoid the troubling specter of
domestic violence which so disturbed the majority.2 20 The only con-
cession he made to the connection between the husband notification
requirement and the incidence of domestic violence was his admis-
sion that in some circumstances the notification requirement possi-
bly may be harmful.221 Having dealt with the problem of domestic
violence in a way that minimized its danger, the Chief Justice was
left free to conclude that the notification requirement served the
husband's interest in protecting the life of his unborn child and the
State's interest in protecting the husband's interest and the mar-
riage.2 22 As with the historical common law on marriage, the Chief
Justice relegated married women to a silent and subordinate role.
C. Who Decides?
"Her suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist...
upon its own vision of the woman's role, however dominant that vi-
sion has been in the course of our history and our culture."223
At its root, the husband notification requirement in Casey con-
cerned decision-making authority within marriage. The question,
to which the majority and dissenting opinions provided diametri-
cally opposed answers, is who is in the best position to make this
important and difficult decision. On the one hand, there is the mar-
ried woman who is in daily contact with her husband and therefore
218. For example, note that the spousal incompetency doctrine in England and
America prevented wives from testifying for or against their husbands on the as-
sumption that the interests of husband and wife inevitably were identical, and fur-
ther, that the interests automatically were those of the husband. The spousal
incompetency doctrine is discussed supra parts L.A and B.
219. "The pro-notification position is implicitly based on an ideal model of family
relations." Ryan & Plutzer, supra note 187, at 42.
220. Chief Justice Rehnquist found that the domestic violence statistics recited by
the majority did not represent hard evidence. 112 S. Ct. at 2871 n.2.
221. Id. at 2871. What becomes clear is that the Chief Justice could not admit
any stronger possibility of harm because to do so would be to find that husbands
could use the requirement to force their decisions on their wives. This result would
too closely resemble the husband's consent requirement invalidated in Danforth.
222. Id. In the closing lines of his discussion of the notification requirement,
Chief Justice Rehnquist attempted to distance his dissent from approving the rea-
soning behind the husband notification requirement by adding the caveat that the
notification requirement only represented a not irrational means of achieving legiti-
mate goals. However, by employing the notoriously forgiving rational basis test, the
Chief Justice tacitly showed his approval of the notification. Id. at 2872.
223. 112 S. Ct. at 2807 (O'Connor, J., writing for the majority).
1993]
Law and Inequality
possesses the best knowledge as to his probable reaction. On the
other hand, there is the Pennsylvania State Legislature, which does
not know the husband, but which continues to subscribe to the com-
mon law notion that the husband's authority is the paramount fac-
tor to consider in fostering marital unity, no matter what the
consequences to the wife.2 24
In striking down the husband notification requirement, Jus-
tice O'Connor allowed married women to make independent deci-
sions in situations where these women thought it best not to inform
their husbands. This decision granted married women a degree of
authority over their place in the marriage and in society.225 In vot-
ing to uphold the notification requirement, Chief Justice Rehnquist
illustrated his belief that married women should not be afforded
independent decision-making authority in marriage. 226 Justice
O'Connor's answer to the question of who is in the best position to
decide thus recognized an equal set of marital roles while the Chief
Justice persistently insisted upon common law roles reminiscent of
Blackstone's era. The close decision in Casey illustrates that it is
too simplistic to state that the American legal system has whole-
heartedly progressed away from common law marital roles and to-
ward more balanced roles.2 27
224. As of 1991, state legislatures were made up of eighty-two percent men and
eighteen percent women. THE AtmmucAN WomAN, supra note 114, at 409.
225. "The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of
the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives."
112 S. Ct. at 2809.
226. The Chief Justice did not explicitly state this conclusion, but in validating
the husband's historical authority, he approved the inevitable corollary that the
wife's historically subordinate role is the correct one. Unlike the historical, social
and legal climate which allowed frank expression of these traditional roles, blatant
discrimination is now considered unacceptable. Therefore, the Chief Justice at-
tempted to strike a neutral stance.
227. For example, a number of states retain similar husband consent or notifica-
tion requirements. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-101(1) (West 1990) (hus-
band's consent required if woman living with her husband); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 390.001(4)(a) (West Supp. 1993) (same); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1015(b)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991) (husband not liable for expense of abortion unless he con-
sents); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40.1299.33D (West 1992) (notice required to husband
if woman is a minor); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-107 (1991) (written notice to hus-
band required); R.I. GEN. LAws § 234.8-2 to -4 (1989) (physician shall inform hus-
band if reasonably possible); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-20(c) (Law, Co-op, 1985)
(husband's consent required in third-trimester abortion); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 34-23A-7 (1986) (husband's consent required if woman is a minor); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-7-304 (physician shall notify husband if possible). These statutes almost
invariably link husband notification with parental consent and notification, thus
presenting another example of grouping married women with minors.
In light of Danforth and Casey, some of these statutes, such as Colorado's and
Florida's, clearly are no longer enforceable, although they remain in the statute
books. The enforceability of other statutes, such as Illinois', remains an open ques-




Historically, the law's conception of married women linked
them to less capable populations, denied their competence, and rel-
egated them to a subordinate role. This antiquated conception of
married women continues to shape and direct legislative action and
judicial decisions. The dangers of the ongoing vitality of these de-
rogatory views of married women are clear: married women remain
vulnerable to economic sanction and physical and psychological vio-
lence by their husbands. As historically has been true, courts and
legislatures fail to prevent these dangers, and, in fact, tacitly en-
courage them.228 Courts and legislatures also persist in denying
married women the authority to make decisions about matters
which intimately affect their lives.
This article focused attention on courts' and legislatures' stub-
born attachment to dangerously outmoded ideas of marital roles.
By highlighting these problems, which are pervasive enough to
touch such disparate areas as husband notification requirements in
abortion statutes and the confidential communication privilege in
evidence law, the article aims to help prevent old common law ideas
from shaping further legal action. The four suggestions discussed
below, combined with the proposed modifications to the confidential
communications privilege in Part II.B, illustrate a few methods by
which more equal marital roles may be achieved.
First, courts and legislators should be aware that the law's
conception of marital unity historically has been premised on mar-
ried women's economic, social, and physical subordination to their
husbands. Because so much of the judicial and legislative popula-
tion remains mired in the common law past, marital unity remains
a problematic judicial and legislative goal. Therefore, any present
or future legislation intended to foster marital unity should be care-
fully examined to assess whether the wife's decision-making au-
thority is being impaired.
Second, judges and legislators should be especially sensitive to
husbands' use of intimidation, threats, and physical violence
against their wives. In the past, courts expressly allowed husbands
to exercise physical authority over their wives. Today, courts and
legislatures tacitly allow husbands to subject their wives to abuse
and pain. In giving total authority to husbands, as the confidential
communication privilege does and the husband notification require-
pecially problematic for the Court because it has now invalidated husband consent
and notice requirements, but upheld parental consent and notice requirements for
minor women.
228. See supra parts II and III.
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ment attempted to do, courts and legislatures ignore the very real
danger of bolstering husbands' physical power over their wives and
family members.
Third, the gender neutral language of judicial opinions and
legislation should not be allowed to conceal old prejudices. The con-
fidential communications privilege and the husband notification re-
quirement serve as excellent examples of how ostensibly neutral
language is used to disguise distinctly gender-specific mandates
and burdens. Both the privilege and the notification requirement
compel married women to act in the manner that their husbands
command. Courts and legislatures must lift the mantle of this no-
noffensive language and peer beneath to determine the damaging
impact of the legislation.
Fourth, courts and legislatures must earnestly consider their
own buried biases concerning husband and wife roles. The common
law history on marital roles is a history of blatant inequality. This
history continues in the present day to enforce unequal roles, but it
does so subtly and quietly. Married women, for example, usually
earn less than their husbands, and so decision-making power qui-
etly favors husbands.229 Married women are under-represented in
the judiciary230 and in the legislative branches of government and
again, judicial and legislative action often subtly validates hus-
bands' authority over their wives.231
The problem of unequal marital roles, created long ago in Eng-
land and inherited and embraced by America, continues today.232
Progress has been made, and yet married women avoided being rel-
egated to their historically subordinate position by only one vote in
Casey. Moreover, married women still live with the "privilege" of
being silenced in order to preserve a common law conception of
marital unity. The deeply rooted prejudices which underlie these
unequal marital roles must be recognized and excised.
229. See supra part I.C, notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
230. As of 1990, thirteen percent of the federal judiciary were women. This per-
centage seems likely to increase during President Clinton's term. Paul M. Barrett,
More Minorities, Women Named to U.S. Courts, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 1993, at B1, B5
(noting that approximately thirty three percent of President Clinton's judicial nomi-
nees have been women). TaE AMRICAN WoMAN, supra note 114, at 411. Women
make up fifty-two percent of the nation's population. Id. at 227.
231. See supra part III.C, note 224.
232. Justice Brennan's observation, written in a dissent concerning a death pen-
alty decision, applies equally well to the topic that this article has explored: "[W]e
remain imprisoned by the past as long as we deny its influence in the present." Mc-
Cleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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